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Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 141 flight training organizations
are actively pursuing ways to increase operational safety by introducing advanced risk
assessment and decision-making techniques. The purpose of the dissertation was to create
and validate a safety performance decision-making tool to transform a reactive safety
model into a predictive, safety performance decision-making tool, specific to large,
collegiate Title 14 CFR Part 141 flight training organizations, to increase safety and aid
in operational decision-making. The validated safety decision-making tool uses what-if
scenarios to assess how changes to the controllable input variables impact the overall
level of operational risk within an organization’s flight department.
Utilizing SPIs determined to be most indicative of flight risk within large,
collegiate flight training organizations, a predictive, safety performance decision-making
tool was developed utilizing Monte Carlo simulation. In a high-risk system beset with
uncertainty, applying Monte Carlo simulation addresses the need to accommodate
uncontrollable inputs into the model in a manner that enables the model to produce
meaningful output data. This research utilizes the validated equations drawn from the
non-statistical model developed by Anderson, Aguiar, Truong, Friend, Williams, &
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Dickson (2020) for the mathematical inputs driving the computational nodes, including
the SPIs, as the foundation to develop the safety performance decision-making tool.
The probability distributions of the uncontrollable inputs were drawn from a
sample of operational data from September 2017 to September 2019 from a large,
collegiate 14 CFR Part 141 flight training organization in the southeastern United States.
The study conducted simulation runs based on true operational ranges to simulate the
operating conditions possible within large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training
organizations with varying levels of controllable resources including personnel (Aviation
Maintenance Technicians and Instructor Pilots) and expenditures (active flight students
and available aircraft).
The study compared the output from three different Verification Scenarios—each
using a unique seed value to ensure a different sample of random numbers for the
uncontrollable inputs. ANOVA testing indicated no significant differences appeared
among the three different groups, indicating the results are statistically reliable.
Four What-if Scenarios were conducted by manipulating the controllable inputs.
Mean probability was the key output and represents the forecasted level of operational
risk on a standardized 0-5 risk scale for the Flight Score, Maintenance Score, Damage
and Related Impact, and an Overall Risk Score. Results indicate the lowest Overall Risk
Score occurred when the level of personnel was high yet expenditures were moderate.
Changes to the controllable inputs are reflected by variations to the outputs
demonstrating the utility and potential for the safety performance decision-making tool.
The outputs could be utilized by safety personnel and administrators to make more
informed safety-related decisions without expending unnecessary resources. The model
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could be adapted for use in any CFR Part 141 flight training organization with data
collection capabilities and an SMS by modifying the input value probability distributions
to reflect the operating conditions of the selected 14 CFR Part 141 flight training
organization.
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1
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A CFR Part 141 organization can be defined as a pilot training school certified
under the specifications defined by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) under
Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 141 (Federal Aviation Administration,
2017). As defined in Advisory Circular 141-1B, academic institutions may offer aviationrelated degrees and pilot training under CFR Part 141; CFR Part 141 flight schools have
the option to utilize a wider variety of training tools; although, dedicated flight training
facilities, qualified flight instructors, and FAA-approved course curricula are still
required (FAA, 2017).
Per Anderson, Aguiar, Truong, Friend, Williams, and Dickson (2020), a large
CFR Part 141 could be defined as a pilot training school operating under Title 14 CFR
Part 141 with the following criteria:
•

At least 500 student pilots

•

A fleet of at least 50 aircraft with the integrated flight instrument system
capabilities

•

A Flight Data Monitoring system with data collection

•

A scheduling system

•

An active and robust Safety Management System (SMS)

The complexity of many aviation accidents and incidents combined with rapid
technological progress has left traditional bottom-up and top-down system safety
assessment techniques outdated and inadequate (Dakwat & Villani, 2018; Dekker, 2011;
Stringfellow, Leveson, & Owens, 2010). A major limitation of traditional safety
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assessment techniques is the challenge of considering all potential risks that may arise
from multiple variables interacting together (Dakwat & Villani, 2018). Mitigative actions
based on the analyses of previous accidents and incidents are both reactive and
insufficient to further the progress of proactive safety management (ICAO, 2013).
Additionally, the absence of accidents and incidents within CFR Part 141 flight training
organizations does not assume operations are functioning at the optimum level of safety
(Adjekum, 2014; Cassens, 2010; Keller, 2015; Mendonca & Carney, 2017). A modern
approach to safety management includes proactively addressing safety risks rather than
relying on inspections and remedial actions.
The complex, high-risk nature of CFR Part 141 flight training organizations
grants particular susceptibility to risk, potentially leading to a series of systematic
failures. This drift into failure occurs through the slow normalization risk, occurring as an
incremental deterioration of safe operating conditions propelled by organizational
failures, misunderstood technology, and social influences (Dekker, 2011).
To avoid the process of drifting into failure, organizations are developing ways to
increase their level of safety by incorporating advanced risk assessment and decisionmaking techniques to strengthen the risk management element of the organization’s SMS
(Ale, Bellamy, Cooke, Goossens, Hale, Roelen, & Smith, 2006). Simulation modeling
techniques are becoming more widely utilized in complex, high-risk systems across
various domains to optimize the safety assessment process (Blair, 2017; Chen & Jing,
2016; Gunduz, Birgonul, & Ozdemir, 2017; Hadjimichael, 2009; Stonesifer, Calkin,
Thompson, & Kaiden, 2014). SPIs are useful for observing and monitoring known risks,
as well as detecting future risks to elicit corrective action before an adverse event
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occurring. SPIs play a valuable role within an organization’s SMS by enabling
performance-based safety management while supporting the organization’s unique safety
objectives (Pierobon, 2016).
However, existing SPIs, although useful in measuring the effectiveness of the
organization’s SMS, are incapable of providing a true predictive approach to safety
decision-making, as the data collected to feed into the SPIs are based on events,
instances, and operations that have already occurred (Patriarca, Di Gravio, Cioponea, &
Licu, 2019). Thus, any responses or corrective action made based on these data findings
is a retroactive approach to safety. The use of what-if scenarios via simulation allows for
an in-depth look at interactions within the system and assesses the impact of a change to
the system before any changes take place, rather than retrospectively assessing the effects
of a change. Further research is needed to transform SPIs into predictive safety decisionmaking tools capable of taking proactive safety one step further by modeling the potential
of the system without compromising resources.
Statement of the Problem
Traditionally, the aviation industry has focused on the utilization of historical
events, such as accident data, or those indicators of safety that are clearly measurable
(Oswald, Zhang, Lingard, Payam, & Tiendung, 2018). However, safety monitoring based
on relevant, operational SPIs is still a reactive approach to safety monitoring backed by
linear reasoning; whereas the aviation risk assessment process must continually evolve
and improve by considering new approaches to safety monitoring and decision-making
that provides greater insight into why accidents occur and how safety is best achieved.
Domain-specific SPIs provide a one-size-fits-all approach to safety monitoring, whereas
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forecasting models provide safety personnel with the ability to foresee how changes to
various operating conditions impact the overall safety of the system pertinent to their
particular operation (Hadjimichael, 2009).
Further research is needed within the industry to transform reactive safety models
based on SPIs into safety decision-making tools, capable of handling the predictive
uncertainty inherent to CFR Part 141 flight training organizations while incorporating the
use of what-if scenarios, to evaluate how modifying the controllable input variables
impact the safety and efficiency of the complex system as a whole. A safety decisionmaking tool, particular to large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organizations yet
adaptable to accommodate any flight training organization with data acquisition
capabilities and an active SMS, would not only allow for a more proactive approach to
safety but could also assist those in administrative roles with critical decision-making.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of the research was to create and validate a safety performance
decision-making tool to transform a non-statistical model composed of 12 SPIs
determined by Anderson, Aguiar, Truong, Friend, Williams, and Dickson (2020) to be
most indicative of flight risk specific to 14 CFR Part 141 flight training organizations into
a predictive, safety performance decision-making tool. The model uses what-if scenarios
to evaluate how changing controllable input variables affect the level of operational risk
within the system, portrayed within the model as the risk score outputs.
The validated model will utilize what-if scenarios to assess how changes to the
controllable input variables influence the overall level of risk within the organization’s
flight department and various other departments.
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The current research utilized the SPIs drawn from the non-statistical SPI model
developed by Anderson et al. (2020), as these SPIs have been found to be most indicative
of operational flight risk for a 14 CFR Part 141 flight training organization. Anderson et
al. (2020) created and validated a non-statistical model encompassing SPIs from both
flight and maintenance operations and their related formulae drawn from a two-year
sample of operational flight and maintenance data. For the purpose of this dissertation,
the SPIs from the non-statistical model developed by Anderson et al. (2020) were used as
the foundation to develop a safety performance decision-making tool based on the input
variables for the chosen SPIs. Monte Carlo simulation was conducted and run to enable
the SPI model to handle uncertainty in some of the key, influential variables.
Significance of the Study
The extant literature indicated a deficit of predictive, safety performance decisionmaking tools specific to large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organizations;
therefore, this research fills an operational need within the industry. The study also
extends the research conducted by Anderson et al. (2020) by expanding the non-statistical
model into a safety performance decision-making tool utilizing Monte Carlo simulation
to improve the accuracy and robustness of the flight training organization’s SMS.
The research also improves the current understanding of the factors most
substantially contributing to flight risk within large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight
training organizations. As a safety decision-making tool, the model could also be used by
the administration within a large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organization to
rationalize new hires, technology acquisitions, and other safety-related initiatives by
modeling the potential of modifying resources, or controllable inputs, without the risk

6
associated with actually expending the organization’s resources. The model could also be
modified for applicable use by any flight training organization with data acquisition
capabilities and an operational SMS.
Theoretically significant, the model provides a mechanism for expanding the
breadth of knowledge related to optimizing resources from both flight and maintenance
operations to enhance operational safety for CFR Part 141 flight training organizations.
Further, a thorough review of the extant literature indicated a gap in the process of going
from traditionally reactive SPIs into safety performance decision-making tools with
forecasting abilities for safety decision-making purposes specific to CFR Part 141 flight
training operations. The research fills this gap by providing a validated safety decisionmaking tool, specific to CFR Part 141 operations, to further move the needle in the
direction of proactive, rather than reactive, aviation safety assessment techniques.
The model created within this dissertation has a high level of generalizability, as
the model could be adapted for use in any large CFR Part 141 flight training organization
with data collection capabilities and an active SMS. This dissertation describes the
process of transforming a reactive safety model composed of SPIs into a safety
performance decision-making tool; thus, a 14 CFR flight training organization could
utilize its own unique SPIs by determining the probability distributions of the
uncontrollable input variables, further enhancing the generalizability of the safety
performance decision-making tool. Providing large, CFR Part 141flight training
organizations with a safety decision-making tool will enhance the risk management
component of the organization’s SMS by taking an increasingly proactive approach to
safety by providing insight into the impact changes to operating conditions may have on
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the safety of the overall operation. The ability to forecast operating conditions using
Monte Carlo simulation will allow CFR Part 141 flight training organizations to make
better informed safety-related decisions while optimizing efficiency without
compromising safety.
Research Question
1. How can the SPI model developed by Anderson, Aguiar, Truong, Friend,
Williams, and Dickson (2020) be transformed into a predictive, safety
performance decision-making tool with the ability to run what-if scenarios?
2. How do changes to the controllable input variables impact the overall risk
score?
Delimitations
The model is designed to measure the potential for increased or decreased flight
risk for large, collegiate flight training programs within the United States. The displayed
level of risk associated with monthly operating conditions can be used to make safetyrelated decisions by organizational safety personnel. The model does not measure
occupational risks, such as injuries incurred in the maintenance hangar or personal slips,
trips, and falls. The model does not measure cases of gross negligence, such as the willful
disregard of standard operating procedures unless such occurrences are deemed to be
systemic in nature. Security threats, including suicide and sabotage, are also not
considered. Human performance state measurements were excluded from the analysis.
Although there are some factors not covered in the study, these delimitations do not
affect the rigor of the model as the SPIs utilized were chosen by Subject Matter Experts
(SMEs) to be most appropriate in gauging flight risk for large, collegiate flight training
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operations within the United States (Anderson et al., 2020). The model is also highly
adaptable and could be modified to include the delimitations not considered within the
research, assuming the organization has the necessary data available.
Limitations and Assumptions
The research conducted for the purpose of this dissertation was limited to the
creation and validation of a safety performance decision-making tool utilizing Monte
Carlo simulation to transform a non-statistical model composed of the ten SPIs
determined by Anderson et al. (2020) into a predictive, safety performance decisionmaking tool capable of running what-if scenarios to evaluate how changing controllable
input variables within the system affect the overall level of operational risk, portrayed
within the model as the overall risk score output. The variables used in this model are
limited to those determined to be most useful in measuring flight risk in a large,
collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organization by SMEs in flight and maintenance
operations (Anderson et al., 2020). Additionally, the model could easily be adapted to
accommodate other flight training organizations with data collection capabilities and an
operational SMS.
Per Anderson, Aguiar, Truong, Friend, Williams, and Dickson (2020), the model
assumes a large CFR Part 141, defined as a pilot training school operating under Title 14
CFR Part 141, possesses the following operational criteria:
•

At least 500 student pilots

•

A fleet of at least 50 aircraft with integrated flight instrument system
capabilities

•

A Flight Data Monitoring system with data collection
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•

A scheduling system

•

A robust and active Safety Management System

This assumption reflects the current state of most large CFR Part 141 flight
training operations.
Summary
High-risk organizations, such as CFR Part 141 flight training organizations, are
actively pursuing ways to increase their level of safety by incorporating improved risk
assessment and decision-making techniques designed as fundamental parts within the
system (Ale, Bellamy, Cooke, Goossens, Hale, Roelen, & Smith, 2006). Simulation
modeling techniques are becoming more widely utilized in complex, high-risk systems
across various domains to optimize the safety assessment process (Blair, 2017; Chen &
Jing, 2016, Gunduz, Birgonul, & Ozdemir, 2017; Hadjimichael, 2009; Stonesifer, Calkin,
Thompson, & Kaiden, 2014). However, existing SPIs, although useful in measuring the
effectiveness of the organization’s SMS, are incapable of providing a true predictive
approach to safety decision-making (Patriarca, Di Gravio, Cioponea, & Licu, 2019).
Aviation safety must continue to improve by considering new approaches to safety
monitoring and decision-making that provide greater insight into why accidents occur and
how safety is best achieved.
A safety decision-making tool, particular to large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight
training organizations yet adaptable to accommodate any flight training organization with
data acquisition capabilities and an operational SMS, would allow for a more proactive
approach to safety by assisting those in administrative roles with critical decisionmaking. Thus, the purpose of the research is to create and validate a safety performance
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decision-making tool based on a non-statistical risk assessment model, or SPI model,
determined by Anderson, Aguiar, Truong, Friend, Williams, and Dickson (2020) to
represent flight risk within large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organizations.
The validated model utilizes what-if scenarios to assess how modifying the controllable
input variables impacts the overall level of risk within the organization’s flight
department and various other departments. Monte Carlo simulation was conducted and
run to enable the SPI model to handle uncertainty in some of the key, influential
variables.
In terms of significance, the extant literature indicated a deficit of predictive,
safety performance decision-making tools specific to large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight
training organizations; therefore, this research fills an operational need within the
industry. Additionally, the research enhances the depth of understanding of the factors
most substantially contributing to flight risk within large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight
training organizations, thus advancing flight safety. As a safety decision-making tool, the
model could also be used by the administration within a large, collegiate CFR Part 141
flight training organization to rationalize hiring, technology acquisition, and other safetyrelated enterprises by modeling the potential of modifying resources, or controllable
inputs, without the risk associated with actually expending the organization’s resources.
The purpose of the research is to create and validate a safety performance decisionmaking tool to transform a nonstatistical model composed of domain-specific SPIs into a
safety decision-making tool adaptable for use in any flight training organization with data
gathering capabilities and an operational SMS. Additionally, the model provides a
mechanism for expanding the breadth of knowledge related to optimizing resources from
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both flight and maintenance operations to enhance operational safety for CFR Part 141
flight training organizations. Providing large, CFR Part 141flight training organizations
with a safety decision-making tool will enhance the risk management element of the
organization’s SMS by taking an increasingly proactive approach to safety by providing
insight into the impact changes to operating conditions may have on the safety of the
overall operation.
Definitions of Terms
14 CFR Part 141

This part prescribes the requirements for issuing
pilot school certificates, provisional pilot school
certificates, and associated ratings, and the general
operating rules applicable to a holder of a certificate
or rating issued under this part (Federal Aviation
Administration, 2017).

Flight Data Monitoring

The analysis of flight data which allows safety
managers to identify trends and fully investigate the
circumstances behind events flagged (EASA, 2016).

Logistical Delay Time

The time from when a flight crew reports an aircraft
as “down for maintenance” to the time the
maintenance personnel opens a work order in order
to address the discrepancy (Anderson et al., 2020).

Monte Carlo Simulation

A mathematical technique that uses randomly
generated values for uncontrollable variables to
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model risk or uncertainty in a certain system (Dunn
& Schultis, 2011).
Occurrences

Accidents or incidents.

Safety Culture

The attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, and values that
employees share concerning safety in the workplace
(Cox & Cox, 1991).

Safety Management System SMS is the formal, top-down, organization-wide
approach to managing safety risk and assuring the
effectiveness of safety risk controls. It includes
systematic procedures, practices, and policies for
the management of safety risks (FAA Order
8000.369).
Safety Performance Indicator A data-based parameter used for monitoring and
assessing performance (ICAO, 2013b).
List of Acronyms
AHP

Analytic Hierarchy Process

ANOVA

Analysis of Variance

ASAP

Aviation Safety Action Program
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE
This chapter describes the present literature surrounding flight safety for CFR Part
141 flight training organizations; safety performance monitoring and measurement;
justification surrounding the need for predictive rather than reactive safety monitoring;
justification for the use of Monte Carlo simulation methods; and a detailed description of
the theoretical foundation driving the research.
Flight Safety for CFR Part 141 Flight Training Organizations
Within the United States, flight training is administered under the oversight of the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) according to the federal regulations outlined in
Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 61, 141, or 142 (FAA, 2016). 14
CFR Part 141 flights schools are certified by the FAA and must meet strict standards to
ensure optimal safety with requirements for personnel, aircraft, facilities, operational
rules, and curriculum, allowing these organizations to train pilots more efficiently by
reducing the flight hour requirements (Mendonca & Carney, 2017).
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) released the Safety
Management Annex (Annex 19) in 2013, requiring participating ICAO member states to
launch a State Safety Program (SSP) and implement an SMS (ICAO, 2013b). SMS
provides CFR Part 141 flight training organizations with the ability to identify and
mitigate safety risks before an accident occurring (Chen & Chen, 2014).
The Safety Risk Management element of the SMS is of particular importance, as
flight training is inherently a high-risk activity (Cassens, 2015). Management and safety
personnel within a CFR Part 141 are constantly making decisions on risk acceptability;
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therefore, safety efforts must focus on the hazards posing the greatest risk to safe
operations (Lu, 2016). The hazard identification process should encompass proactive,
reactive, and predictive safety data collection techniques and approaches (ICAO, 2013b).
The severity of aircraft accidents is a particularly challenging variable to
anticipate and predict (Bastos, 2005, Mendonca & Carney, 2017). Thus, risk analysis
techniques, such as the use of risk matrices, for flight schools must take into
consideration the pertinent safety attributes of the organization, including its safety
culture, specific operational conditions, and the applicable safety standards (Mendonca &
Carney, 2017). However, the safety effort of a 14 CFR Part 141 flight school will not
succeed exclusively by adherence to standard operating procedures and company policy
(ICAO, 2013b). Rather, SMS encourages taking a proactive approach to safety by
continuing to develop and adapt to the safety risk management process. Introducing novel
techniques to the safety assessment process beyond reactive risk matrices, such as a
predictive safety decision-making tool, will transform the risk assessment process from
reactive to predictive with very little risk involved.
Safety Performance Monitoring
Mitigative actions based on the analyses of previous accidents and incidents are
both reactive and insufficient to further the progress of proactive safety management
(ICAO, 2013). Additionally, the absence of accidents and incidents within CFR Part 141
flight training organizations does not assume operations are functioning at the optimum
level of safety (Adjekum, 2014; Cassens, 2010; Keller, 2015; Mendonca & Carney,
2017). A modern approach to safety management includes proactively addressing safety
risks rather than relying on inspections and remedial actions.
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With the introduction and requirement of an SMS, the focus is shifting from
archaic forms of reactive data collection and analysis toward approaches and techniques
that bolster and improve the effectiveness of the organization’s SMS. A vital portion of
this process includes the development and implementation of safety performance
indicators (SPIs). ICAO Doc 9859, Safety Management Manual, and ICAO Annex 19
define an SPI as a data-driven safety constraint used for observing and evaluating an
organization’s safety performance. SPIs are used to monitor and mitigate known safety
risks to elicit corrective action before an adverse event occurring. Pierobon, 2016).
(Pierobon, 2016).
Safety performance indicators. Quantitative performance indicators must be
identified to achieve optimal safety within the organization. SPIs allow for the formation,
execution, and review of safety policies within an organization (Reiman & Pietikäinen,
2010). Ensuring the SPIs meet the organization’s predetermined safety goals has posed
one of the greatest challenges to the development of a performance algorithm with risk
prediction capabilities (Janicak, 2015). Thus, the particular safety requirements of the
organization must be identified and prioritized throughout the process as pertinent SPIs
are selected (Blair, 2017).
SPIs have been developed and utilized to improve the risk assessment process of
various high-risk domains, including the aviation industry. Hadjimichael (2009)
published a model founded on operational SPIs airlines can utilize to assess operational
risk (Hadjimichael, 2009). Netjasov, Crnogorac, and Pavlović (2019) proposed a conflict
risk assessment model composed of a set of seven SPIs specific to the Air Traffic
Management system safety. Domain-specific SPIs have been useful in improving safety
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within the civil aviation domain as well (Chen and Li, 2016). Additionally,
Panagopoulos, Atkin, and Sikora (2017) proposed a framework proposing how
organizations could use SPIs for root-cause analysis of safety considerations. Findings
exemplify the usefulness of SPIs in providing insight into the operating conditions of the
organization as a whole.
Existing methods for determining and measuring SPIs. Effective safety
management requires thoughtful consideration of the system and the processes driving
the system; this cannot be achieved without some form of measurement (Safety
Management International Collaboration Group, 2013). Rather than selecting SPIs based
on convenience, SPIs must be selected with consideration given to the feedback required
to ensure the organization’s requirements for safety management can be effectively
evaluated. The selection of SPIs can be determined through a systems analysis based on
safety audit results (Jackman, 2018).
Focus groups utilizing SMEs are another approach to determining the most
relevant SPIs (Anderson et al., 2020). The focus groups could also be used to develop the
algorithms for each SPI and provide useful feedback on the selected SPIs. The use of
focus groups over mathematical methods presents many advantages. For example, the use
of focus groups is relatively inexpensive. The facilitated discussion process utilized to
elicit information from focus groups allows expert participants to build upon each other’s
responses; this is useful for needs assessments and evaluation purposes (Leung &
Savithiri, 2009). Focus groups also allow researchers to obtain more information from
verbal, candid responses than may be obtained via survey methods. However, the focus
group methodology is not without limitations. Focus groups rely heavily on facilitated
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discussion to produce results emphasizing the critical of the facilitator’s skills as a
moderator. Finally, the use of focus groups makes the findings more difficult to
generalize to the larger population due to the inherent weakness of the focus group
selection process (Leung & Savithiri, 2009).
Forecasting to improve safety outcomes. Aviation safety has been managed
based on analyzing accidents and incidents after they have already occurred. Although
this strategy has allowed the industry to make strides in improving safety, a major
drawback is the reactive nature of this approach; as, safety analysis based on hindsight
has restricted the process to primarily focusing on innately negative aspects, such as
errors and failures within the system (Patriarca, Di Gravio, Cioponea, & Licu, 2019).
Rather, the cyclical approach of measuring, analyzing, and providing feedback through a
robust SMS has the potential to provide a more holistic, data-driven approach to safety
monitoring. Thus, rather than focusing solely on historical events or reports monitoring
should take a more proactive approach by assessing the various components of the
system and how they contribute to the functioning of the system as a whole. This could
be accomplished by incorporating forecasting techniques into the safety risk management
element of an organization’s SMS to aid in further understanding the performance
variability that occurs within complex systems like aviation.
Traditionally, organized institutions have been relatively resistant to change
(Jepperson, 1991; Verweijen & Lauche, 2019). As organizations adhere to institutional
standards, such as those prescribed by the FAA under CFR Part 141 operating conditions,
safety monitoring practices could become increasingly taken-for-granted leading to
problems within the operation (Verweijen & Lauche, 2019). In high-hazard industries,
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this lack of adaptability can undermine organizational safety. Despite statistically high
safety rates within the aviation domain, occurrences continue to take place. Researchers
argue that a proactive, systematic analysis of safety risk management utilizing modern
techniques, such as forecasting, could aid in evolving an industry that has been
traditionally reactive to one that is proactive in its risk assessment process (Dyhrberg &
Jensen, 2004; Insua, Alfaro, Gomez, Hernandez-Coronado, & Bernal, 2019; Verweijen &
Lauche, 2019).
Although risk matrices have been able to provide qualitative assessments of risk
on an ordinal scale, risk matrices provide little insight into the consequences of various
choices made by the organization and how these consequences impact the system as a
whole. Rather, forecasting models provide sophisticated methods to assess aviation safety
occurrence outcomes to bolster an aviation organization’s safety risk management
practices (Insua et al., 2019). Further, forecasting models could be utilized for decisionmaking purposes by aviation authorities, insurance companies, aviation operators,
aviation companies, and aviation training facilities (Insua et al., 2019).
Monte Carlo Simulation
Monte Carlo simulation provides a useful methodology to propagate uncertainties
further evolving reactive safety models and indices into innovative and predictive models
useful for forecasting safety performance (Hacura, Jadamus-Hacura, & Kocot, 2001).
Monte Carlo methods use repeated random sampling to estimate the many potential
outcomes that cannot be determined with certainty. This is accomplished by modeling
ranges of potential values where uncertainty exists by analyzing the combination of
outputs produced by the model. Thus, the outputs provide a range of possible outcomes
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as well as a probability density curve used to determine outcome frequency. Monte Carlo
simulation is particularly useful for modeling complex systems where uncertainty exists
to assess the impact of risk. Monte Carlo methods have led to several innovative
improvements in various fields such as physics, game theory, finance, maritime, nuclear,
and aviation (Hacura, Jadamus-Hacura, & Kocot, 2001).
The selection of either analytical (e.g. point estimate methods) or simulation
methods (e.g. Monte Carlo simulation) will be shaped by the following considerations
(Safety and Reliability Society, n. d., p. 3):
•

Complexity of the system

•

Scope

•

Accuracy

•

Future development

•

Application

Advantages of Monte Carlo simulation. According to Stolzer and Goglia
(2015), Monte Carlo methods have many appealing characteristics over point estimate
methods. Monte Carlo simulation methods provide researchers with more valuable
information than point estimate methods; account for inherent uncertainties; and provide
the location of any specific risk estimate allowing for a level of risk to be selected within
the model that corresponds to the desired level of risk protection (Stolzer & Goglia,
2015). From a research perspective, the process of building the simulation can also
enhance the depth of understanding of the true system. Monte Carlo methods can be used
for sensitivity analysis and system optimization without impacting the real system (Spall,
2003). Using Monte Carlo methods allows for improved control over experimental
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conditions within the modeled system. Finally, researchers can either compress or expand
time within the model, something not possible working within the limitations of the real
system (Spall, 2003).
The usefulness of Monte Carlo methods is echoed by Faghih-Roohi, Xie, and Ng
(2014), who used Monte Carlo simulation as an analytical approach to accident risk
modeling in the maritime environment. Faghih-Roohi et al. (2014) support Monte Carlo
simulation applications for risk modeling due to the probabilistic attributes associated
with risk. Basic statistics, such as summary statistics or accident rates, are not adequate
for long-term risk prediction, further testifying the usefulness of Monte Carlo methods to
evaluate risk amidst extensive uncertainties (Faghih-Roohi et al., 2014).
Disadvantages of Monte Carlo simulation. However, simulating the real system
using Monte Carlo methods does pose several disadvantages. For example, depending on
the commercial simulation software packages used, it may be very costly and timeconsuming to build a simulation. Further, Monte Carlo simulation relies on random
number generation to solve deterministic problems; therefore, it is possible that a
simulation could be stretched beyond the limits of credibility influencing the validity of
the model when using commercially-sold software packages due to their lack of
consideration of the underlying assumptions and limitations determined by the researcher
(Spall, 2003). Another potential disadvantage is that Monte Carlo simulation provides
several, perhaps millions, of runs at given input values, whereas analytical solutions
provide exact values (Spall, 2003).
Monte Carlo process and tools. Monte Carlo simulations perform risk analysis
in complex systems by creating a model of potential results by using probability
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distributions for any variable within the model that has inherent uncertainty. Evaluating
the outputs of probability distributions allows for a much more realistic method of
describing uncertainty. The fundamental steps of conducting a Monte Carlo simulation
are as follows:
1. Define the problem and simulation features
2. Identify the key components and variables within the model
3. Define input parameters, including probability distributions and equations, for
each variable
4. Define simulation scenarios
5. Select control values that will be manipulated
6. Run the simulation with a predetermined amount of trials (e.g. 1,000 trials)
7. Analyze the results of the output tables using both descriptive statistics and
sensitivity analysis to test edge cases
8. Either return to Step 4 and redefine the next scenario or choose to complete
the simulation at this point (Ayres, Schmutte, & Stanfield, 2017)
A computer is required to run Monte Carlo simulations. In addition to a basic PC
spreadsheet, various probabilistic simulation platform software exists to run Monte Carlo
simulations, such as Analytica by Lumina Decision Systems. Analytica is software for
developing and evaluating quantitative decision models for modeling risk and
uncertainty.
Monte Carlo applications in aviation research. Safety performance assessment,
based on advanced risk assessment methodologies, is a pressing challenge within the air
transport and training sector (Di Gravio, Mancini, Patriarca, & Costantino, 2015).
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Historically, the aviation domain has used simple metrics such as accident rates to gauge
safety performance; however, reactive metrics are not representative of the level of safety
present across the various facets of the system (Di Gravio et al., 2015).
The FAA and the EUROCONTROL Performance Review Commission have
identified shared performance indicators to monitor safety by proposing a standard
occurrence reporting and assessment plan defined under ESARR 2 Appendix A and B
(EUROCONTROL, 2009). ESARR 2 Appendix A and B outlines the process of
collecting and recording the information elicited from safety occurrence reports. This
plan was developed based on James Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model of Accident
Causation, which relates organizational failures to an alignment of metaphoric “holes” or
weaknesses in the system so when these holes line up, a hazard slips through the holes of
the various layers of defenses leading to drift into failure (Dekker, 2011; Reason, 1997).
However, safety assessment must consider the potential impact of any safetyrelated event. Minor, or less serious events, may happen more frequently testifying the
importance of including occurrence statistics rather than solely accident statistics (Di
Gravio et al., 2015). Using proactive safety indicators, Monte Carlo simulation has the
potential to provide an analytical model, based on historic data distributions, allowing the
decision-maker to model potential events and determine how these less serious events, or
occurrences, impact the safety of the system.
Over the past decade, Monte Carlo simulation has been used for modeling and
calculating aircraft collision risk both on the ground and in the air. Jacquemart and Morio
(2013) created a Monte Carlo simulation to evaluate conflict probabilities between
aircraft, demonstrating the utility of Monte Carlo simulation for air transportation safety.
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Belkhouche (2013) utilized Monte Carlo simulation for collision risk modeling and
assessment for autonomous air vehicles to calculate the probability of a mid-air collision
occurring in the presence of uncertainties. According to Belkhouche (2013), Monte Carlo
methods have an important advantage in aircraft collision risk modeling because it does
not explicitly use speed and orientation information, such as collision cone angles, to
calculate the probability of a collision occurring in the presence of uncertainties in nonlinear systems with non-Gaussian, or non-normal, distributions; rather, collision risk is
expressed as simple inequalities allowing for the estimation of probability under difficult
and varying scenarios. In their text, Dunn and Shultis (2011) exemplify the application of
Monte Carlo methods across domains and situations of varying complexity. Careddu,
Costantino, and Di Gravio (2008) and Stroeve, Blom, and Bakker (2013) have used
Monte Carlo methodologies to validate advancements made on runway incursion events.
Di Gravio, Mancini, Patriarca, and Costantino (2015) conducted a study aimed at
improving Air Traffic Management safety by creating a statistical model of safety events
using Monte Carlo simulation to predict safety performance, further validating the utility
of Monte Carlo simulation in improving air transportation safety. However, the extant
literature indicates a deficit of Monte Carlo simulation models to be used as safety
decision-making tools specific to CFR Part 141 flight training organizations.
Based upon a review of the relevant literature and due to the influx of
uncertainties and daily variability in the air traffic system, Monte Carlo is an appropriate
method for forecasting safety performance within the aviation industry. Further, for the
purpose of the research, Monte Carlo is the most appropriate methodology due to a large
majority of the input variables being subject to uncertainty.
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Gaps in the Literature
Although forecasting methods, such as Monte Carlo simulation, have grown in
application in the aviation sector over the past decade, the industry still relies heavily on
reactive processes, such as risk matrices alone and SPIs, within their SMS risk
assessment process. SPIs, although useful in measuring the effectiveness of the SMS, are
incapable of providing a true predictive approach to safety. A thorough review of the
extant literature indicated a gap in the process of transitioning from traditionally reactive
SPIs into safety decision-making tools with forecasting abilities for safety decisionmaking purposes specific to CFR Part 141 flight training operations. Further research is
needed to transform SPIs within a non-statistical model into predictive safety decisionmaking tools capable of taking proactive safety one step further by modeling the potential
of the system without compromising resources.
The extant literature also indicates a deficit of validated models capable of
utilization as decision-making tools specific to CFR Part 141 flight training
organizations. Two commercial airlines, legacy carrier, Southwest Airlines, and a large,
low-cost carrier based out of Brazil, are currently in the process of developing safety
performance tools based on risk assessment models composed of domain-specific SPIs;
however, these models do not utilize simulation and are reactive in nature. The models
developed by these air carriers apply to commercial operations and would be difficult to
adapt to flight training operations. Thus, the research conducted for this dissertation fills
an operational need within the industry.
This research fills these gaps by providing a validated safety decision-making
tool, specific to CFR Part 141 flight training operations, bolstering the research in the

26
area of proactive, rather than reactive, aviation risk assessment techniques. The model
could also be adapted to accommodate the operational needs of any flight training
organization with data procurement abilities and an operational SMS.
Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework driving the research was founded upon a non-statistical
model developed by Anderson, Aguiar, Truong, Friend, Williams, and Dickson (2020).
Anderson et al. (2020) conducted a sequential, mixed-method design study including a
qualitative data collection and analysis phase, followed by a quantitative data collection
and analysis phase.
Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) in the area of CFR Part 141 maintenance and
flight operations selected the appropriate Safety Performance Indicators (SPIs). Once the
appropriate SPIs had been selected, formulas were developed to quantify each selected
SPI, based on monthly, operational-performance data collected by a CFR Part 141 flight
school in the Southeast region of the United States. The Risk Indicator Score Card was
developed to compute a standardized risk score for each month of both flight and
maintenance operations. Expert elicitation was used to establish inter-rater reliability for
the assessment of SMEs’ evaluations.
Twelve SPIs were selected for use within the model. SPIs 1-6 MX encased the
maintenance side of operations; SPIs 1-6 FLT includes indicators relevant to flight
operations. The SPIs, variables, and brief descriptions can be found in Table 1. Table 2
outlines the SPIs and their quantifiable formulae.
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Figure 1. Diagram of the non-statistical model developed by Anderson et al. (2020)
composed of SPIs and associated indicators.

Table 1
Safety Performance Indicators and Attributing Variables
SPI
Variables
SPI-1 MX: Schedule Logistical Delay Time (minutes)
Pressure

Description
Used to measure the
schedule pressure faced by
personnel; provides insight
into the efficiency of the
operation; saturation
indicator.

SPI-2 MX: Schedule Aviation technicians available
Pressure/ Personnel Fleet flight time

Used to determine whether
there are too few
technicians available
increasing the likelihood of
an error occurring.

SPI-3 MX: Schedule Percentage of aircraft available
Pressure/ Aircraft
Total aircraft in fleet

Analyzes the schedule
pressure technicians
experience by assessing the
number of aircraft down for
maintenance relative to the
total number of aircraft
available in the fleet.

28
SPI
SPI-5 MX:
Unscheduled Events

Variable
Unscheduled maintenance orders
under $10k
FAA occurrences reports
Fleet flight time

Descriptions
Measures the oversights
made by technicians;
although rare, selected due
to the catastrophic nature
associated with errors
committed by maintenance
personnel.

SPI-6 MX: Errors

Number of aircraft dispatched
with maintenance errors
Number of total work orders
processed

Selected to capture the total
volume of maintenance
orders processed related to
fleet flight time; indicates
the overall health of the
operation and insight into
when a safe threshold of
schedule pressure may have
been exceeded.

SPI-1 FLT:
Occurrences

Number of reported tail strikes
Number of hard landings
Number of unstabilized
approaches
Number of RPM overspeeds
Number of over/under G
exceedances
Number of flap overspeeds
Fleet flight time

Selected as a general
assessment of how safely
the aircraft are being flown.

SPI-2 FLT: Safety
Culture

Safety culture survey criterion
Number of safety culture surveys
received

Based upon the institution’s
yearly safety culture survey
designed to annually assess
the state of the
organization’s safety
culture.

SPI-3 FLT: NMACs

Number of traffic conflicts
Fleet flight time

Chosen for tracking internal
traffic conflicts.

SPI-4 FLT: Staffing

Number of full-time equivalent
instructor pilots (average weekly)
Active flight students (average
weekly)

Selected to assess the level
of saturation within the
flight department to ensure
there are enough flight
instructors staffed to meet
flight student demands.

29
SPI
SPI-5 FLT:
Turnover

Variables
Number of months flight
instructors are active at the
institution

Description
Selected to measure the
average experience level of
instructor pilots working at
the institution; it was
assumed a correlation exists
between the level of
experience and safety.

SPI-6 FLT: Safety
Reporting

Number of events reported

Selected as an assessment of
safety and the climate of the
organization’s reporting
culture.

Damage and Related Number of NTSB accident
Impact
reports
Number of FAA incident reports
Number of unscheduled
maintenance reports > $10,000
Fleet flight time

Provides a comprehensive,
external perception of the
risk associated with the
operation.

Table 2
Safety Performance Indicators and Quantifiable Formulae
SPI
SPI-1 MX:
Schedule
Pressure/
Logistical
Delay

Formulae

𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 (𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠)

SPI-2 MX:
Schedule
Pressure/
Personnel

𝐴𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠 𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒
𝐹𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑡 𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒

SPI-3 MX:
Schedule
Pressure/
Aircraft

𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑡 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑏𝑙𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑡
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SPI
SPI-4 MX:
Schedule
Pressure/
Flow
SPI-5 MX:
Unscheduled
Events
SPI-6 MX:
Errors
SPI-1 FLT:
Occurrences

Formulae
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑑
𝐹𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑡 𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒

𝑈𝑛𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 $10𝑘 + 𝐹𝐴𝐴 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠
𝐹𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑡 𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑑

(𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑠) + (𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠) + (𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠) +
(𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑃𝑀 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑠) + (𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟/𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑔)
+(𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑝 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑠)
𝐹𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑡 𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒

SPI-2 FLT:
Safety
Culture

(0.039 ∗ 𝑃𝐼3) + (0.064 ∗ 𝑆𝑂3) + (0.079 ∗ 𝐸𝐹𝐿𝑆3) + (0.085 ∗ 𝐸𝐹𝐿𝑆8) + (0.092 ∗ 𝑃𝑆1)
+(0.081 ∗ 𝑃𝑆3) + (0.067 ∗ 𝑃𝑆7) + (0.043 ∗ 𝑃𝑅𝑆1) + (0.07 ∗ 𝐸𝐶2) +
(0.072 ∗ 𝑅𝑆2) + (0.043 ∗ 𝑄𝑁𝐻4) +
(0.032 ∗ 𝑄𝑁𝐻5) + (0.018 ∗ 𝑀𝑂1)
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑦𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑

SPI-3 FLT:
NMACs

𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑠
𝐹𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑡 𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒

SPI-4 FLT:
Staffing

𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑡𝑠
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠

SPI-5 FLT:
Turnover

𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 𝑎𝑠 𝑎𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑡 𝑎𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

SPI-6 FLT:
Safety
Reporting

𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 (𝐴𝑆𝐴𝑃 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙)

Damage and
Related
Impact

((

𝑁𝑇𝑆𝐵 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 ∗ 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒) + 𝐹𝐴𝐴 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 +
)
𝑈𝑛𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑋 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 > 10𝐾
𝐹𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑡 𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒

The Risk Indicator Score Card. Ultimately, an individual standardized risk
score, as well as an overall risk score, was developed to calculate the monthly level of
risk associated with flight and maintenance operations. Figure 2 demonstrates the
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nonstatistical model output before its transformation into the Risk Indicator Score Card.
Depicted in Figure 3, the model output transitions into the Risk Indicator Score Card,
representing risk on a 0-5 risk scale. Figure 4 demonstrates the display format potential of
the Risk Indicator Score Card for utility and ease of use.

Figure 2. Nonstatistical model output prior to Risk Indicator Score Card transition.
Note. Notational data only. Not representative of actual data or performance.

Figure 3. Output of the Risk Indicator Score Card.
Note. Notational data only. Not representative of actual data or performance.
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Figure 4. Display potential for the Risk Indicator Score Card.
Note. Notational data only. Not representative of actual data or performance.

Similar efforts. Southwest Airlines and a Brazilian low-cost carrier are
conducting similar efforts relevant to commercial flight operations. Both airlines are in
the process of developing or have developed an algorithm that provides a risk score for
both the operation and individual safety scores for each department (Southwest Airlines,
2019). Using the foundations of ICAO Annex 19 and FAA guidance, Mendonca and
Carney (2017) have also developed a model for CFR Part 141 operators; however, the
model focuses specifically on using the four components of SMS and is intended to
encourage a thriving safety culture among CFR Part 141 operatives. Additionally, the
model developed by Mendonca and Carney (2017) has no predictive capabilities.
From reactive to predictive safety monitoring. The research conducted for this
dissertation transformed the non-statistical model developed by Anderson et al. (2020)
into a predictive, Monte Carlo simulation composed of real-time data input for the chosen
SPIs. The Monte Carlo simulation is useful for safety decision-making to run what-if
scenarios for the assessment of how variations to input variables impact the overall level
of operational risk within the organization’s flight department.
Summary
Under Annex 19, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) requires
members to establish a State Safety Program, requiring certain services be provided to
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implement a Safety Management System (SMS). SMS provides CFR Part 141 flight
training organizations with the ability to foresee and mitigate potential safety risks before
an adverse event occurs (Chen & Chen, 2014). SMS encourages taking a proactive
approach to safety by continuing to develop and adapt the safety risk management
process.
Traditionally, aviation safety has been managed on the basis of analyzing
accidents and incidents after they have already occurred. Although this strategy has
allowed the industry to make strides in improving safety, a major drawback is the
reactive nature of this approach; safety analysis based on hindsight has restricted the
process to primarily focus on innately undesirable aspects within the system (Patriarca,
Di Gravio, Cioponea, & Licu, 2019). Effective safety monitoring should take a proactive
approach by assessing the various components of the system and how they contribute to
the functioning of the system as a whole. SMS has traditionally utilized SPIs to supervise
known safety risks and expose developing risks to elicit corrective action before an
adverse event occurring. SPIs play a valuable role in SMS by enabling performancebased safety management. However, SPIs are reactive in nature; therefore, introducing
novel techniques to safety assessment beyond reactive risk matrices, such as a predictive
safety decision-making tool, will transform the risk assessment process from reactive to
predictive with very little risk involved. This is a modern approach to safety management
and includes safety risks being addressed proactively rather than relying on inspections
and remedial actions.
Researchers also argue that a proactive, systematic analysis of safety risk
management utilizing modern techniques, such as forecasting, could aid in evolving an
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industry that has traditionally been reactive to one that is proactive in its risk assessment
process (Dyhrberg & Jensen, 2004; Insua, Alfaro, Gomez, Hernandez-Coronado, &
Bernal, 2019; Verweijen & Lauche, 2019). Forecasting models provide sophisticated
methods to assess the outcomes of aviation safety occurrences to bolster an aviation
organization’s safety risk management practices (Insua et al., 2019). Further, forecasting
models could be utilized for decision-making purposes by aviation authorities, insurance
companies, aviation operators, aviation companies, and aviation training facilities (Insua
et al., 2019).
Monte Carlo simulation provides a useful methodology to account for
uncertainties in the model’s predictive algorithms and allows for the modeling of intricate
systems where uncertainty exists, or random variables are involved, to assess the impact
of risk without impacting the real system (Spall, 2003). Over the past decade, Monte
Carlo simulation has been used for modeling and calculating aircraft collision risk both
on the ground and in the air. However, the extant literature indicates a deficit of Monte
Carlo simulation models to be used as safety decision-making tools specific to CFR Part
141 flight training organizations. Based on a review of the relevant literature and due to
the influx of uncertainties and daily variability in the air traffic system, Monte Carlo is an
appropriate method for forecasting risk within the aviation industry.
A thorough review of the extant literature indicated a gap in the process of
transitioning from traditionally reactive SPIs into safety decision-making tools with
forecasting abilities for safety decision-making purposes specific to CFR Part 141 flight
training operations. The extant literature also indicates a deficit of validated models
capable of utilization as decision-making tools specific to CFR Part 141 flight training
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organizations. This research fills these gaps by providing a validated safety decisionmaking tool, specific to CFR Part 141 flight training operations, bolstering the research in
the area of proactive aviation safety assessment techniques. The model could also be
adapted to accommodate the operational needs of any flight training organization with
data procurement abilities and an operational SMS.
The theoretical framework driving the research is the non-statistical model
developed by Anderson, Aguiar, Truong, Friend, Williams, and Dickson (2020).
Anderson et al. (2020) built and validated, via expert elicitation, a non-statistical model
composed of 12 Safety Performance Indicators (SPIs) encompassing both flight and
maintenance operations. The data is based on a two-year sample of operational
performance data from a 14 CFR Part 141 flight training facility in the southeastern
United States. SPIs were used to develop a Risk Indicator Score Card depicting the level
of monthly, operational risk for flight operations; maintenance operations; and overall,
combined operations.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
The dissertation utilized the Monte Carlo simulation method to build a safety
decision-making tool based on SPIs determined by Anderson et al. (2020) to represent
flight risk within large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organizations to evaluate
predictive, what-if scenarios to evaluate how the variations to controllable input variables
affect the risk score outputs indicating the level of risk posed to safe operating conditions.
The study did not involve human subject testing or data collection from human subjects;
thus, the research did not require Institution Review Board (IRB) approval.
Research Method Selection
The study used the quantitative method to convert the non-statistical model
developed by Anderson et al. (2020) using Monte Carlo simulation into a safety decisionmaking tool to run what-if scenarios to assess how modifications to the controllable input
variables impact the level of operational risk within an organization’s flight department.
The use of Monte Carlo simulation is valuable in accommodating the uncertainty and
variability of 22 uncontrollable input variables, as the only controllable input variables
are the four listed below. The remaining variables were subject to uncertainty.
•

The number of full-time instructor pilots,

•

The number of aviation maintenance technicians available,

•

The number of active flight students, and

•

The total number of aircraft in the fleet.

Papadopoulos and Yeung (2001) describe many advantages for using Monte
Carlo simulation to address uncertainty, including the ability of Monte Carlo simulation
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to handle large amounts of uncertainty within the input variables and the lack of concerns
regarding the interactions between input variables. Faghih-Roohi et al. (2014) support the
use of Monte Carlo simulation for risk modeling due to the probabilistic attributes
associated with risk; whereas basic statistics, such as summary statistics or accident rates,
are insufficient for long-term risk prediction. Monte Carlo methods also allow for
sensitivity analyses and evaluation of the system without the need to operate the real
system, leaving valuable resources uncompromised (Spall, 2003). Thus, the model
created for the purpose of this dissertation can exemplify the effects of uncertainty in
typical, collegiate flight operations by simulating many thousand potential outcomes to
generate an accurate representation of the range of probable outcomes given the
uncertainty of the uncontrollable input variables (Farrance & Frenkel, 2014).
The current research addresses the following research questions:
1. How can the SPI model developed by Anderson, Aguiar, Truong, Friend,
Williams, and Dickson (2020) be transformed into a predictive, safety
performance decision-making tool with the ability to run what-if scenarios?
2. How do changes to the controllable input variables impact the overall risk
performance score?
To address Research Question 1, Monte Carlo simulation was utilized to
transform the non-statistical risk assessment model composed of SPIs developed by
Anderson et al. (2020) into a predictive, safety performance decision-making tool.
Research Question 2 was answered by utilizing distributions and ranges of values to
simulate the many thousands of potential outcomes within the what-if scenarios allowing
for an assessment of how the variations to the controllable input variables influence the
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overall level of operational risk. After manipulating the controllable input variables, or
resources with respect to personnel, students, and aircraft, the probability distribution
output from the what-if scenarios then allows safety personnel and administration to
make more informed safety-related decisions, based on the level of risk predicted by the
what-if scenarios, without expending unnecessary resources.
Population and Sample
Population and sampling frame. The target population to which the model
generalizes is large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organizations within the
United States operating under the specifications defined by the FAA within Title 14 of
the Code of Federal Regulations Part 141 (Federal Aviation Administration, 2017). The
sampling frame consisted of two-years of operational data from both flight and
maintenance operations dating from September 2017 to September 2019 for a large,
collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organization in the southeastern United States.
Sample size. The sample data used to determine the probability distributions of
the uncontrollable input variables within the model was comprised of two years of
operational flight and maintenance data from a large, collegiate 14 CFR Part 141 flight
training organization in the southeastern United States. Monte Carlo simulation utilizes
probability distributions drawn from raw operational data to simulate the vast range of
operating conditions within large, CFR Part 141 operations.
Sampling strategy. To ensure simulation scenarios are representative of the
target population, true operational ranges representative of a large, collegiate 14 CFR Part
141 flight training organizations in the United States were used to enhance the
generalizability of the model. The study conducted simulation runs based on the true
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operational ranges specified below to simulate the range of operating conditions possible
within a large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organization with varying levels of
resources with respect to personnel (Aviation Maintenance Technicians and Instructor
Pilots), students, and aircraft:
•

Aviation Maintenance Technicians available: 14-35

•

Aircraft available: 50-82

•

Full-time Instructor Pilots: 100-200

•

Active Flight Students: 335-1300

These ranges were selected because they are reflective of the higher and lower
operational limits of the sample data drawn from a large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight
training operation in the southeastern United States. The model could easily be adapted
for use in both small and large CFR Part 141 flight training organizations and any flight
training organization with data procurement abilities and an operational SMS.
Data Collection Process
Design and procedures. This section describes the design and use of the
mathematical model in detail. Figure 5 depicts the structural definition of the model in
Analytica. The green-colored squares depict the four controllable input variables. The
light blue-colored ovals represent the 22 uncontrollable input variables specified as
probability distributions supplying an array of random values to the model based on
probability distributions drawn from the raw data sample. The blue rounded rectangular
boxes are SPIs from the non-statistical model developed by Anderson et al. (2020) and
depict calculation nodes producing the results of the model. The equations driving these
calculations can be found in Table 5 and will be described further later in this section.
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The orange trapezoid represents a value that is input as a constant. The impact value was
input into the model as a constant value as injuries and damage are challenging to predict
due to their variability in nature. Thus, a constant value of 1 indicated no damage or
injuries incurred was selected for the purpose of this dissertation. The pink hexagons
represent the risk score output variables.

Figure 5. Structural definition of the model in Analytica.
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Monte Carlo process and steps. The steps involved in preparing, creating, and
running a Monte Carlo simulation can be found in Figure 6.

Figure 6. Monte Carlo steps and processes overview adapted from “Stats: data and
models,” by R.D. De Veaux, P. F. Velleman, and D. E. Bock, 2012. Copyright 2012 by
Pearson Education, Inc.
Step 1-Defining the problem and simulation features. The first step involves
identifying the problem, scope, and research questions for driving model development. A
detailed discussion of the problem, scope, and research questions driving the research can
be found in Chapter 1 of this manuscript.
Step 2- Variable identification. The next step involves identifying the key
components and variables within the model. The input variables for the model were
selected based on the contributing variables relevant to each SPI within the non-statistical
model developed by Anderson et al. (2020). The variables, relevant SPIs, and
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categorization as either uncontrollable or controllable input variables can be found in
Table 3.

Table 3
Input and Output Variables for the Model
Relevant SPI

Variables
Fleet flight time (hobbs)

SPI-1 MX: Schedule
Pressure
SPI-2 MX: Schedule
Pressure/ Personnel
SPI-3 MX: Schedule
Pressure/ Aircraft

Logistical Delay Time (minutes)
Technicians available
Percentage of aircraft available
Total aircraft in fleet

SPI-4 MX: Schedule
Pressure/ Flow
SPI-5 MX:
Unscheduled Events

Number of total maintenance
orders processed
Unscheduled maintenance orders
under $10k
FAA occurrences reports

SPI-6 MX: Errors

Number of aircraft dispatched
with maintenance errors

SPI-1 FLT:
Occurrences

Number of reported tail strikes
Number of hard landings
Number of unstable approaches
Number of RPM overspeeds
Number of G exceedances
Number of flap overspeeds

SPI-2 FLT: Safety
Culture

Number of surveys collected
Factor Scores

Variable Type
Input
Uncontrollable
Input
Uncontrollable
Input
Controllable
Input
Uncontrollable
Input
Controllable
Input
Uncontrollable
Input
Uncontrollable
Input
Uncontrollable
Input
Uncontrollable
Input
Uncontrollable
Input
Uncontrollable
Input
Uncontrollable
Input
Uncontrollable
Input
Uncontrollable
Input
Uncontrollable
Input
Uncontrollable
Input
Uncontrollable
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Relevant SPI
SPI-3 FLT: NMACs

Variables
Number of traffic conflicts

Number of full-time equivalent
instructor pilots (Average weekly
number)
Active flight students (Average
weekly number)
Number of months flight
SPI-5 FLT: Turnover
instructors are active at
institution (average)
SPI-6 FLT: Safety
Number of events reported
Reporting
(ASAP and event)
Damage and Related
Number of NTSB accident
Impact
reports
SPI-4 FLT: Staffing

Number of FAA incident reports

Outputs

Number of unscheduled
maintenance reports > $10,000
Maintenance Score
Damage and Related Impact
Score
Flight Score
Overall Risk Score

Variable Type
Input
Uncontrollable
Input
Controllable
Input
Controllable
Input
Uncontrollable
Input
Uncontrollable
Input
Uncontrollable
Input
Uncontrollable
Input
Uncontrollable
Output
Output
Output
Output

Step 3- Defining parameters. The third step involved defining the input
parameters for each variable. This included defining the probability distribution of the
data relevant to each variable and the associated equations for each SPI to the variable’s
parameters. To accomplish this, a two-year sample of operational data from a large,
collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organization was analyzed.
Determining the distributions for uncontrollable inputs. The distributions for the
uncontrollable inputs were derived from a two-year sample of operational data from a
large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organization in the southeastern United
States. Utilizing Minitab 19 statistical software, the sample of data for each
uncontrollable input was run through Minitab 19 to identify the distributions of the data.
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Each sample of data produced a Goodness of Fit Test table and probability plots to
visually identify the distributions. The visual probability plots were used to initially
determine distributions of the data, and the p-values from the Goodness of Fit Test table
were used to validate the distributions. The distributions for the uncontrollable inputs can
be found in Table 4.

Table 4
Probability Distributions for Uncontrollable Input Variables
Uncontrollable Input Variable
Fleet flight time (hobbs)

Data Type
Continuous

Probability Distribution
Normal

Logistical Delay Time (minutes)

Continuous

Weibull

Percentage of aircraft available

Discrete

Uniform

Number of total maintenance
orders processed

Discrete

Logistic

Unscheduled maintenance orders
under $10k
FAA occurrences reports

Discrete

Binomial

Discrete

Geometric

Number of aircraft dispatched
with maintenance errors

Discrete

Bernoulli

Number of reported tail strikes

Discrete

Poisson

Number of hard landings

Discrete

Poisson

Number of unstable approaches

Discrete

Lognormal

Number of RPM overspeeds

Discrete

Poisson

Number of G exceedances

Discrete

Poisson

Number of flap overspeeds

Discrete

Poisson
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Uncontrollable Input Variable

Data Type

Probability Distribution

Discrete

Binomial

Continuous

Certain

Discrete

Negative Binomial

Discrete

Binomial

Discrete

Certain

Number of FAA incident reports

Discrete

Binomial

Number of unscheduled
maintenance reports > $10,000

Discrete

Poisson

Number of traffic conflicts
Number of months flight
instructors are active at
institution (average)
Number of events reported
(ASAP and event)
Number of NTSB accident
reports
Impact value

Defining outcome equations. Once the distributions have been determined, the
outcome for each component of the model was defined. This was accomplished by
defining the associated equations for each SPI to the variable’s parameters in Analytica.
Table 5 delineates each SPI, the Damage and Related Impact variable, and their
associated equations that were used within the model. The mathematical algorithms and
concepts used for the simulations were derived from focus group participants and SMEs
in the areas of flight and maintenance operations at a large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight
training organization and were externally validated utilizing an independent group of
external SMEs in the area of commercial flight safety operations (Anderson et al., 2020).
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Table 5
Model Equations
SPI
SPI-1 MX:
Schedule
Pressure/
Logistical
Delay

Equation
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 (𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠)

SPI-2 MX:
Schedule
Pressure/Pers
onnel

𝐴𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠 𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒
𝐹𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑡 𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒

SPI-3 MX:
Schedule
Pressure/Airc
raft

𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑡 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑏𝑙𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑡

SPI-4 MX:
Schedule
Pressure/
Flow
SPI-5 MX:
Unscheduled
Events
SPI-6 MX:
Errors

𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑑
𝐹𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑡 𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒

𝑈𝑛𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 $10𝑘+𝐹𝐴𝐴 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠
𝐹𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑡 𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒

𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑑

SPI-1 FLT:
Occurrences
and Close
Calls

(𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑠)+(𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠)+
(𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠)+
(𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑃𝑀 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑠)+(𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 ⁄𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑔)
+(𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑝 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑠)
𝐹𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑡 𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒

SPI-2 FLT:
Safety
Culture

(0.039∗𝑃𝐼3)+(0.064∗𝑆𝑂3)+(0.079∗𝐸𝐹𝐿𝑆3)+(0.085∗𝐸𝐹𝐿𝑆8)+(0.092∗𝑃𝑆1)+(0.081∗𝑃𝑆3)+
(0.067∗𝑃𝑆7)+(0.043∗𝑃𝑅𝑆1)+(0.07∗𝐸𝐶2)+(0.072∗𝑅𝑆2)+(0.043∗𝑄𝑁𝐻4)+
(0.032∗𝑄𝑁𝐻5)+(0.018∗𝑀𝑂1)

SPI-3 FLT:
NMACs

𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑦𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑

𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑠
𝐹𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑡 𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒
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SPI
SPI-4 FLT:
Staffing

Equation
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑡𝑠
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠

SPI-5 FLT:
Turnover

𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 𝑎𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑡 𝑎𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

SPI-6 FLT:
Safety
Reporting

𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 (𝐴𝑆𝐴𝑃 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙)

Damage and
Related
Impact

(

(𝑁𝑇𝑆𝐵 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 ∗ 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒) + 𝐹𝐴𝐴 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 +
)
𝑈𝑛𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑋 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 > 10𝐾
𝐹𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑡 𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒

Damage and
Related
Impact Score
Maintenance
Score
Flight Score

Overall
Risk Score

5∗

∑[

∑[

(𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 − 0)
(0.0025 - 0)

(𝑆𝑃𝐼 1 𝑀𝑋 ∗ 0.10) + (𝑆𝑃𝐼 2 𝑀𝑋 ∗ 0.15) + (𝑆𝑃𝐼 3 𝑀𝑋 ∗ 0.10) +
]
(𝑆𝑃𝐼 4 𝑀𝑋 ∗ 0.10) + (𝑆𝑃𝐼 5 𝑀𝑋 ∗ 0.10) + (𝑆𝑃𝐼 6 𝑀𝑋 ∗ 0.25)

(𝑆𝑃𝐼 1 𝐹𝐿𝑇 ∗ 0.25) + (𝑆𝑃𝐼 2 𝐹𝐿𝑇 ∗ 0.125) + (𝑆𝑃𝐼 3 𝐹𝐿𝑇 ∗ 0.25)
]
+(𝑆𝑃𝐼 4 𝐹𝐿𝑇 ∗ 0.125) + (𝑆𝑃𝐼 5 𝐹𝐿𝑇 ∗ 0.125) + (𝑆𝑃𝐼 6 𝐹𝐿𝑇 ∗ 0.125)

∑[

(𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 ∗ 0.3) + (𝐹𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 ∗ 0.3)
]
+(𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 ∗ 0.4)

Step 4- Define simulation scenarios. Next, the simulation scenarios were defined.
For the purpose of the research, the scenarios were based upon manipulation of the four
controllable input variables: the number of aviation maintenance technicians (AMTs)
available, the total number of aircraft in the operational fleet, the number of active flight
students, and the number of full-time equivalent instructor pilots (IPs).
The selection of scenarios for the study was designed to reflect typical operating
conditions within a large, collegiate CFR Part 141 training operation and included
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manipulation of the controllable input variables to simulate changes to typical operating
conditions to determine how these changes impacted the level of risk within the system as
a whole. The study conducted simulations runs with the following specifications to
provide output data for a large, CFR Part 141 operation with varying levels of resources.

Table 6
Ranges of Controllable Input Variables for Simulation Runs
Controllable Input
AMTs available

Range
14-35

Aircraft available

50-82

Full-time instructor pilots (Ips)

100-200

Active flight students

335-1300

These ranges were selected because they are reflective of the higher and lower
operational limits of the sample data drawn from a large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight
training operation in the southeastern United States. By conducting simulation runs that
model a range of available resources with regard to personnel, students, and aircraft,
decision-makers could then determine the optimal level of resources necessary to meet
operational demands while staying above a predetermined level of acceptable risk,
thereby maintaining safety. Data collected from the scenarios, defined by using different
specifications for the controllable input variables, were compared for sensitivity effects
and were organized in a graphical output depicting the relationship between the
controllable inputs and resulting risk score outputs.
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Step 5- Select control values. To demonstrate the utility of the safety performance
decision-making tool for real-world use, the controllable input values used to generate the
what-if scenarios within the Monte Carlo simulation model were determined based on
permutational variations drawn from the ranges of normal operating conditions specific
to CFR Part 141 flight training organizations, depicted in Table 6. The selection of
specific scenarios for the study focused on manipulating the controllable input variables:
the number of aviation maintenance technicians available, the total number of aircraft in
the fleet, the number of full-time instructor pilots, and the number of active flight
students. The output of the model included probability curves depicting how changes to
the controllable input variables impacted the flight score, maintenance score, damage and
related impact score, and overall risk score output. The controllable input values for the
four What-if Scenarios can be found in Table 17 of Chapter 5 of this dissertation.
Step 6- Run the simulation. Once the conceptual model was created in Analytica
and the variable parameters and distributions were defined, the software ran the
simulation model with 10,000 trials. The model utilizes Analytica® by Lumina Decision
Systems as the software to complete the simulation. The Analytica software defines the
mathematical model using a flowchart-type graphical representation and defines
distributions for use as input data while providing the processing environment for
repeated trails. The software also collects and organizes output data from each simulation
trial to statistically analyze, examine, and compare scenario results. The simulation model
predicts safety by rendering outputs based on four primary, controllable input variables:
aviation maintenance technicians available, total aircraft in fleet, number of active flight
students, and the number of full-time equivalent instructor pilots. These controllable
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input variables were manipulated to assess how changes to the controllable inputs
impacted the outputs, or risk scores.
Step 7- Analyze the results. The results of the scenario were then analyzed to
determine how the defined changes to the input variables impacted the outputs: the flight
score, the maintenance score, damage and related impact score, and the overall risk score.
Analysis of the results, including model validation, was conducted by performing a
descriptive statistical analysis of the output tables for all trials within a particular
scenario. The output tables contained the calculated probability of data from the various
scenarios. The output tables were then organized in graphical format depicting the
relationships between the controllable variables and the subsequent changes to the flight
score, maintenance score, and overall risk score outputs. A sensitivity analysis was
utilized to test edge cases, based on data from the various scenarios, to determine if the
model could be modified to increase the overall sensitivity of the risk score outputs.
Step 8- Next scenario/stop. From this point, the criteria for the next simulated
scenario could be defined and run until a sufficient number of scenarios have been
completed. The next step required a decision to be made between returning to Step 4Define the simulation scenarios, or returning to Step 1 and repeating the steps required to
run another scenario. For the purpose of this dissertation, upon completion of the fourth
What-if Scenario, the decision was made to stop adding scenarios.
Apparatus and materials. The software utilized for the Monte Carlo simulation
was Analytica Educational Professional release 4.6.1.30 by Lumina Decisions Systems.
This software allows researchers to model the uncertainty and variability of the input
variables within the model. With Analytica, the researcher can graphically design the
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model simulation, as depicted by the screenshot of the simulation model from Analytica
in Figure 5. Microsoft Excel 2013 was used to process the data and to analyze and
illustrate characteristics of the intermediate input data, or SPIs, generated by the
algorithms in the Analytica model. Microsoft Excel 2013 was also used for post-hoc
testing and analysis.
Sources of the data. The sample of data used to determine the probability
distributions for the uncontrollable input variables was drawn from a two-year sample of
operational flight and maintenance data ranging from September 2017 to September 2019
from a large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organization in the southeastern
United States. The time period of September 2017 to September 2019 was selected to
accurately capture probability distributions that are representative of the most current
operating conditions, following the academic calendar, for a large, collegiate CFR Part
141 flight training organization. Utilizing probability distributions that are representative
of the most current operating conditions enhances the validity of the model. The sample
of data was analyzed in MiniTab Statistical Software to obtain Goodness of Fit tests to
determine the probability distributions of the data sample to use within the Monte Carlo
simulation. The study did not involve any human subjects or experimentation.
Ethical Considerations
Using simulations to support executive decision-making introduces various types
of ethical concerns related to the reliability and validity of the model. According to
Barlow (2009), models are often deliberately built and used to form the basis for various
forms of analysis using simulation techniques, the results of which are used to support
organizational decision-making; the consequences associated with supporting executive
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decision-making via modeling techniques is the potential impact on innocent third
parties. The “utility of a (simulation) study depends on the quality of the model and the
skill of the modeler” (Barlow, 2009, p. 433). This testifies to the fundamental limitation
of the modeling and simulation process − the development of a model and simulation
provides no guarantee of a valid or successful outcome. Therefore, there is an ethical
obligation to ensure the reliability and validity of both the SPIs driving the model, as well
as the safety decision-making tool itself, before application and implementation within a
CFR Part 141 flight training organization.
Data Analysis Approach
Reliability assessment method. Various trials of the model were ran using
different random number generator seed values to confirm the output of the simulation
produced consistent results across trials. The distributions of the output variables were
compared with descriptive statistics from simulation to simulation to demonstrate
consistency. ANOVA testing was used to test for differences across sets of results (Hoyt,
1941).
To assess the model’s reliability, the outputs were compared. Arbitrarily selected
random number generator seed values were chosen to guarantee a different sequence of
random numbers is produced for each trial. The seed value establishes the starting
position in Analytica’s random number generation function. This tests the model to
determine if the results produced were consistent. ANOVA testing was conducted to
determine if significant differences existed between the outputs of the reliability tests.
Validity assessment method. Typically, model validation occurs by utilizing
two separate activity threads where one thread is used to ensure the mathematical
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calculations produced the expected results, and the other thread is used to compare the
probability outputs of the model to similar models. In this case, the challenge with
establishing a formal comparison of results between this model and the models developed
in other studies is that no other studies directly address the same research questions.
Rather, little work has been done in the realm of predictive modeling for large, collegiate
CFR Part 141 flight training organizations. Researchers from the Brazilian low-cost
carrier and Southwest Airlines are currently developing a similar model for assessing risk
in CFR Part 121 operations, but their models are reactive in nature rather than predictive.
Both the Brazilian low-cost carrier and Southwest Airlines have yet to publish their
findings. Therefore, model validation occurred via the use of Subject Matter Experts
using a standardized expert elicitation questionnaire distributed in a survey format
(Anderson et al., 2020). Expert elicitation is the process of acquiring probabilistic belief
statements from experts in a particular domain to assist in the process of quantifying
uncertainty (Colson & Cooke, 2018). Inter-rater reliability was determined by calculating
Kappa values. Since more than two experts were utilized, the use of Fleiss’ Kappa was
most appropriate (Stemler & Tsai, 2008).
The mathematical formulae used within the SPIs were derived from the formulae
developed by Anderson et al. (2020). The formulae developed by Anderson et al. (2020)
were established and validated via the expert elicitation process based on feedback from
SMEs. To ensure no error occurred during the process of inputting the mathematical
computations into the model, Verification Scenarios 1, 2, and 3 were conducted to ensure
the random number generators produced a set of data values that is representative of the
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raw data sample. Each node within the model was assessed and manually verified to
ensure the expected results.
Data analysis process. Both Microsoft Excel and Minitab 19 Statistical
software were used for basic statistical analysis. The model produced a set of probability
curves demonstrating the operating conditions within a large, collegiate CFR Part 141
flight training organization given different values of the controllable inputs. The study
ran the simulation with 10,000 trials for a given scenario with manipulated controllable
input values. Analytica rendered the results of each scenario in graphical and statistical
formats capturing the output from each scenario in separate result matrices. The mean,
standard deviation, maximum, and minimum values were used to determine the impact
on either the flight or maintenance score and the overall risk score. ANOVA testing was
also used to test for differences across sets of results (Hoyt, 1941). A Generalized
Sensitivity Analysis (GSA) (Spear & Hornberger, 1980) was conducted to analyze the
results of the What-if Scenarios. GSA is a technique that considers the sensitivity of
model outputs to model inputs by separating the input parameter values into two
distributions: those that created results that exceeded a specific threshold (“failed”) and
those that created results that were below the threshold (“pass”). Separating the model
output into two sample sets allows for the evaluation of the two sample sets as a function
of any predetermined input parameter selected to represent a threshold of safe operation.
GSA can also detect the presence of high output values for specific ranges of input
parameters better than the other methods (Makino, McKenna, & Wakasugi, 2001).
Conducting a GSA on the results of the what-if scenarios will allow for an enhanced, in-
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depth assessment of the resulting uncertainty within the model with respect to the effects
of input parameter uncertainty.
Summary
The research builds a safety decision-making tool to evaluate what-if scenarios to
evaluate how the changes to controllable inputs affect the SPIs determined by Anderson
et al. (2020) to represent flight risk within large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training
organizations. This research combined with former researcher efforts (Anderson et al.,
2020) has provided the basis and expanded architecture used to build this model.
Utilizing a quantitative methodology, the goal of the study was to expand the nonstatistical model developed by Anderson et al. (2020) using Monte Carlo simulation to
develop a safety decision-making tool to run what-if scenarios to assess how variations to
the controllable input variables impacted the level of operational risk within an
organization’s flight department. Monte Carlo analysis was applied to enable the model
to defensibly handle uncertainty in several key input variables while enabling the model
to describe the range of possible outcomes given a set of controllable inputs to the model.
The target population to which the model generalizes is large, collegiate CFR Part
141 flight training organizations within the United States operating under the
specifications defined by the FAA under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part
141 (Federal Aviation Administration, 2017). The sampling frame consisted of the
operational data from both flight and maintenance operations for a large, collegiate CFR
Part 141 flight training organization in the southeastern United States. The sample data
used to determine the probability distributions of the uncontrollable input variables
within the model was based on a two-year sample of operational data from SPIs
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developed by Anderson et al. (2020) for a large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training
organization in the southeastern United States.
The study conducted simulation runs based on specified ranges to simulate the
range of operating conditions possible within large, CFR Part 141 operations with
varying levels of resources concerning personnel (AMTs and IPs), students, and aircraft.
These ranges were chosen because they are representative of flight training operations
within large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training operations (Anderson et al., 2020).
The selection of scenarios for the study was based on permutational variations of typical
operating conditions within a large, collegiate CFR Part 141 training operation and
included manipulation of the controllable input variables to simulate various operating
conditions. The controllable input variables were manipulated to effectively simulate the
operating conditions of a large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organization.
These ranges were chosen because they were found to be representative of real-world
flight training operations within large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training
organizations.
The software utilized for the Monte Carlo simulation was Analytica Educational
Professional release 4.6.1.30 by Lumina Decisions Systems. Microsoft Excel 2013 was
used to process the data and analyze and illustrate characteristics of the intermediate
input data, or SPIs, generated by the algorithms in the Analytica model. Microsoft Excel
2013 was used for post-hoc testing and analysis.
Various trials of the model were ran using different random number generator
seed values to confirm the output of the simulation produced consistent results across
trials. The distributions of the output variables were compared with descriptive statistics
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from simulation to simulation to demonstrate consistency. ANOVA testing was used to
test for differences across sets of results (Hoyt, 1941). To assess the model’s reliability,
the outputs were compared. Arbitrarily selected random number generator seed values
were chosen to guarantee a different sequence of random numbers is produced for each
trial.
Concerning model validation, the challenge with establishing a formal
comparison of results between this model and the models developed in other studies is
that no other studies directly address the same research questions. Rather, little work has
been done in the realm of predictive modeling for large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight
training organizations. This research utilizes the validated equations drawn from the nonstatistical model developed by Anderson et al. (2020) for the mathematical inputs driving
the computational nodes, including the SPIs, the Flight Score, Maintenance Score,
Damage and Related Impact Score, and the Overall Risk Score, as the foundation to
develop the safety performance decision-making tool.
The model produced a set of probability curves demonstrating the operating
conditions within a large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organization given
different values of the controllable inputs. The study ran the simulation with 10,000 trials
for a given scenario with manipulated controllable input values to identify the sensitivity
of the results to specific probabilistic inputs within the model. Analytica rendered the
results of each scenario in multiple graphical forms capturing the output from each
scenario in separate result matrices. The mean, standard deviation, maximum, and
minimum values were used to determine the impact on either the flight or maintenance
score and the overall risk score. ANOVA testing was also used to test for differences
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across sets of results (Hoyt, 1941). A Generalized Sensitivity Analysis (GSA) was
conducted to evaluate the results of the what-if scenarios and determine if the sensitivity
of the model could be improved (Spear & Hornberger, 1980).
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Chapter 3 described the steps necessary to transform a nonstatistical model
composed of domain-specific SPIs into a safety performance decision-making tool, using
Monte Carlo simulation, to run what-if scenarios to assess how variations to the
controllable input variables impact the level of operational risk within a large, collegiate
CFR Part 141 flight training organization. Determining the probability distributions of the
uncontrollable input variables from the sample data allowed for the nonstatistical model
to be transformed into a predictive, safety performance decision-making tool.
This chapter describes the results in four general sections. The first three sections
answer the first research question – how can the SPI model developed by Anderson,
Aguiar, Truong, Friend, Williams, and Dickson (2020) be transformed into a predictive,
safety performance decision-making tool with the ability to run what-if scenarios?
Section one details the output of the verification testing process. Section two includes
data describing the reliability test results of the model. Section three depicts the validity
test results of the model. The fourth section demonstrates the utility of the model both
statistically and graphically in response to research question two – how do changes to the
controllable input variables impact the Overall Risk Score?
Demographic Information
The sample data used to determine the probability distributions of the
uncontrollable input variables for the Monte Carlo simulation was comprised of two
years of operational flight and maintenance data from September 2017 to September
2019 from a large, collegiate 14 CFR Part 141 flight training organization in the
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southeastern United States. The sample is 14 CFR Part 141 flight training organizations.
Descriptive statistics of the raw data sample can be found in Table 7. The demographic
distribution of the sample 14 CFR Part 141 flight training organization can be found in
Figure 6. Operating at a capacity of approximately 7,000 flight hours per month, the
demographic results of the sample fall within the normal range of operating conditions
determined to be representative of 14 CFR Part 141 flight training organizations by
SMEs in the area of CFR Part 141 flight training organizations.

Table 7
Descriptive Statistics of the Raw Data Sample
SPI
1-MX
2-MX
3-MX

4-MX

5-MX

6-MX

1-FLT

Variable
Lower Limit Higher Limit
Logistical delay time
100
310
AMTs Available*
14
35
Fleet flight time
4000
13500
Percent of AC
70
100
available
Total AC available*
50
82
Fleet flight time
4000
13500
Total MX orders
100
1200
processed
Unscheduled MX
300
1000
orders <$10K
FAA occurrences
0
40
Fleet flight time
4000
13500
Total MX orders
100
1200
processed
AC dispatched w/ MX
0
2
error
Unstable approaches
Flap overspeeds
G exceedances
Tail strikes
RPM overspeeds
Hard landings
Fleet flight time

0
0
0
0
0
0
4000

946
3
3
10
3
7
13500

Mean
203.8579
21
7365.717

SD
46.7893
3.5033
1674.774

83.8003

4.6361

62.236
7365.717

6.2056
1674.774

514.9677

118.706

468.1397

132.7093

6.32
7365.717

4.7847
1674.774

514.9677

118.706

0.12

0.3317

78.0129
0.56
0.44
1.64
0
1.2
7365.717

229.9836
0.7118
1.0033
1.9339
0
1.6583
1674.774
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SPI
2-FLT
3-FLT
4-FLT
5-FLT
6-FLT

Variable
Lower Limit Higher Limit
Annual SC survey
1
5.76
results
Traffic conflicts
0
18
Fleet flight time
4000
13500
Full-time Ips*
100
200
Active flight students*
335
1300
Months as an IP
0
12
Event reports
25
150

Damage FAA incident reports
&
Related
Impact
Unsched MX > $10K
NTSB reports
Fleet flight time
*Controllable input variable

Mean

SD

4.6

0.0181

8.04
7365.717
138
656
10
67.3372

3.0752
1674.774
8.8600
179.8793
0
20.5756

0

3

0.2

0.4082

0

3

0.96

0

3

0.16

1.5133
0.3742

4000

13500

7365.717

1674.774

Model Verification Testing
The simulation used Analytica 64-bit Educational Professional software Release
4.6.1.30 by Lumina Decision Systems. To ensure the model’s algorithms were accurately
entered in the simulation software, the content of each node of the model depicted in
Figure 5 was verified for consistency with the model equations depicted in Table 5.
Input nodes, comprised of probability distribution data, were statistically and
graphically examined to substantiate the output conformed to each input’s specific
distribution profile, as determined by a two-year sample of raw operational flight and
maintenance data ranging from September 2017 to September 2019 from a large,
collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organization in the southeastern United States.
Computational nodes, depicted by light blue rounded rectangles in Figure 5, were verified
by comparing the node’s simulated output to the results of manual calculations drawn
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from the sample data. There are 22 uncontrollable inputs that were supplied as random
numbers within the bounds of their specified probability distributions. These inputs can
be found in Table 3. For model verification purposes, the output of each of these
distributions is examined below from a simulation run with 10,000 trials.
Three Verification Scenarios were conducted. Within Verification Scenario 1, the
values selected to serve as controllable input variable values in Table 8 were determined
by calculating the mean value for each variable of the sample data. The purpose of using
the mean value of each variable from the sample data was to ensure the output of the
model was representative of the CFR Part 141 flight training organization’s true
operating conditions determined by the raw data sample.
The values for the controllable input variables in Verification Scenario 2 were
drawn from the low values of the operational ranges for CFR Part 141 flight training
organizations depicted in Table 6, whereas the controllable input variables for
Verification Scenario 3 were drawn from high operational range values. High and low
range values were selected to represent the varying operational capacities of the target
population. By conducting simulation trials that model a range of available resources
concerning personnel, students, and aircraft, decision-makers could then determine the
optimal level of resources necessary to meet operational demands while staying above a
predetermined level of acceptable risk, thereby maintaining safety.
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Table 8
Verification Scenario 1 Controllable Input Values
Controllable Input
AMTs available

Value
22

Aircraft available

56

Full-time instructor pilots (Ips)

138

Active flight students

681

Note. Source: Raw data means. Sample: 10,000; Random seed: 99

Table 9 depicts the output values and the shape of the distribution for each
uncontrollable input variable in Verification Scenario 1 extracted from the outputs of the
model. The shape of the distributions of the uncontrollable input variables from
Verification Scenario 1 is the same as the distributions drawn from the raw data sample.
The higher and lower limits of the raw data sample were included for comparison
purposes (Anderson et al., 2020).
For each SPI, the higher limit was calculated by analyzing the two-year sample of
data for a specific SPI, finding the operational month with the highest data point value
and dividing the highest value by the operational month with the lowest data point value.
A lower limit was determined by reversing the equation, and dividing the lowest value
over a two-year span of sample data by the highest value. As determined by the model
output for Verification Scenario 1, the mean values for all 22 uncontrollable inputs fell
within the boundaries of the lower and higher limits of the raw data.
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Table 9
Verification Scenario 1 Comparison Input

SPI
1-MX
2-MX
3-MX

4-MX

5-MX

6-MX

1-FLT

2-FLT
3-FLT
4-FLT

5-FLT
6-FLT

Variable
Logistical delay
time
AMTs Available*
Fleet flight time
Percent of AC
available
Total AC
available*
Fleet flight time
Total MX orders
processed
Unscheduled MX
orders <$10K
FAA occurrences
Fleet flight time
Total MX orders
processed
AC dispatched w/
MX error
Unstable
approaches
Flap overspeeds
G exceedances
Tail strikes
RPM overspeeds
Hard landings
Fleet flight time
Annual SC survey
results
Traffic conflicts
Fleet flight time
Full-time Ips*
Active flight
students*
Months as an IP
Event reports

Input Variable Distributions
Min
Max
Distribution
Value Value Mean
Shape

Raw Data Sample
Lower
Higher
Limit
Limit

102

297

212

Weibull

100

310

22
4006

22
13300

7602

Normal

14
4000

35
13500

70

100

85

Logistic

70

100

56

56

50

82

4006

13300

7602

Normal

4000

13500

100

800

532

Logistic

100

1200

415

500

577

Binomial

300

1000

1
4006

49
13300

6
7602

Geometric
Normal

0
4000

40
13500

107

1036

535

Logistic

100

1200

0

1

0.05

Bernoulli

0

2

6

767

156

Lognormal

0

946

0
0
0
0
0
4006

3
3
7
1
5
13300

0.55
0.42
2.72
0.5
1.7
7602

Poisson
Poisson
Poisson
Poisson
Poisson
Normal

0
0
0
0
0
4000

3
3
10
3
7
13500

4.6

4.6

4.6

Certain

1

5.76

1
4006
138

25
13300
138

10
7602

Binomial
Normal

0
4000
100

18
13500
200

681

681

335

1300

10

10

10

0

12

39

108

67

25

150

Certain
Negative
Binomial
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SPI
Damage
&
Related
Impact

Variable
FAA incident
reports

Input Variable Distributions
Min
Max
Value Value SPI
Variable
0

Unsched MX >
0
$10K
NTSB reports
0
Fleet flight time
4006
*Controllable input variable

Raw Data Sample
Min Value Max Value

1

0.2

Binomial

0

3

3

0.91

Poisson

0

3

1
13300

0.34
7602

Binomial
Normal

0
4000

3
13500

Once the uncontrollable input variables were verified to be representative of the
raw data based on the shape of the probability distribution outputs, the minimum,
maximum, and mean values for each calculation node, or SPI, were compared with the
lower and higher limits of the raw data, shown in Table 10. Close inspection indicated the
model’s output, including the maximum and minimum values, were generally lower than
the lower and higher limits of the raw data; however, the mean values of the SPIs all fall
within the bounds of the raw data.
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Table 10
Verification Scenario 1: SPI Comparison Outputs

SPI
SPI-1 MX
SPI-2 MX
SPI-3 MX
SPI-4 MX
SPI-5 MX
SPI-6 MX

Min
1.712
0.0016
1.25
0.0121
0.0369
0

SPI-1 FLT
SPI-2 FLT
SPI-3 FLT
SPI-4 FLT
SPI-5 FLT
SPI-6 FLT

0.001
4.6
0.0002
4.9348
10
35

SPI Distributions
Max
Mean
4.874
3.532
0.0055
0.003
1.786
1.516
0.1888
0.0731
0.1393
0.0698
0.005
0.0001
0.1799
4.6
0.0034
4.9348
10
103

0.0224
4.6
0.0013
4.9348
10
67

Raw Data Sample
Lower Limit
Higher Limit
1.6667
5.1667
0
0.00875
0.8537
2
0.0074
0.3
0
0.26
0
0.02
0
1
0
2
0
0

0.0302
5.76
0.0045
8
36
200

The next step in the verification process included examining each standardized
SPI as well as the Damage and Related Impact variable, depicted in Figure 5 as a blue
rounded rectangular computational node. To accurately feed into a standardized risk
score output ranging from 0-5, the model fed each SPI computational node into an
individual standardized SPI node. The output for each standardized SPI computational
node, as well as the standardized Damage and Related Impact variable, were compared
with the lower and higher limits of the raw data. This output can be found in Table 11.
Results indicated that the mean values of each standardized SPI and the standardized
Damage and Related Impact variable fell between the lower and higher limits of the raw
data, further verifying the accuracy of the model.
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Table 11
Verification Scenario 1: Standardized SPI Comparison Outputs
SPI Distributions
Min
Max
Mean
0
5
2.878
2.112
4.609
3.717
1.73
4.064
2.882
0
5
1.724
0
5
1.601
0
5
0.0974

Raw Data Sample
Min
Max
Mean
0.8883
4.8501
2.5948
2.1639
4.2139
3.285
1.1229
3.4422
2.8129
0.2209
1.3921
1.103
0.3281
1.7218
1.2976
0
0.4562
0.0512

SPI-1 FLT
SPI-2 FLT
SPI-3 FLT
SPI-4 FLT
SPI-5 FLT
SPI-6 FLT

0
1.218
0
2.446
3.611
0

5
1.218
5
2.446
3.611
5

0.5917
1.218
1.702
2.446
3.611
2.382

0.0189
1.2185
0.3660
0.4610
3.6111
0.8000

2.0034
1.2185
2.0590
3.9552
3.6111
4.0250

0.5187
1.2185
1.1916
2.4291
3.6111
3.108

Damage &
Related
Impact

0

0.4197

0.084

0

0.6233

0.1220

SPI
SPI-1 MX
SPI-2 MX
SPI-3 MX
SPI-4 MX
SPI-5 MX
SPI-6 MX

Table 12
Verification Scenario 1: Risk Score Output Comparisons
Output Variable Distributions
Manual Calculation
Risk Score Output
Min
Max
Mean
Min
Max
Maintenance
1.007
2.805
1.49
0.9272
1.7378
Score
Flight Score
1.121
3.466
1.781
1.3347
2.0705
Damage &
Related Impact
0
0.4197
0.084
0
0.3349
Score
Overall Risk Score
0.7336
1.609
1.015
0.7854
1.1698
Note. The mean model output values fall within the minimum and maximum ranges
manually calculated based on the raw data, verifying the model’s calculations produced
viable output values.
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Finally, Table 12 depicted the mean, minimum, and maximum values for the Risk
Score probability density outputs for maintenance, flight, the Damage and Related
Impact, and the Overall Risk Score for the operation as a whole. The risk score outputs
were manually calculated using the raw data sample values for two years of operational
flight and maintenance data from a CFR Part 141 flight training organization in the
southeastern United States. For verification purposes, the maximum and minimum values
were used. The mean output for all four of the controllable risk score outputs fell between
the maximum and minimum values of the raw data sample. Thus, the output values
calculated by Analytica, specifically the mean values, fell within the bounds of the
manual calculations of the outputs, given the input values used for verification testing.
The resulting outputs produced the following distribution of values shown below in
Figures 6, 7, 8, and 9.

Figure 6. Probability density distribution of the Maintenance Score in Verification
Scenario 1.
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Figure 6 demonstrates the resulting probability density distribution output of the
Maintenance Score in Verification Scenario 1. Results portrayed a mean risk score output
of 1.49, indicating a safe level of maintenance operation under the specifications for the
controllable input variables. The shape of the distribution visually indicates the vast range
of potential output scores resulting from running the simulation through 10,000 trials.

Figure 7. Probability density distribution of the Flight Score in Verification Scenario 1.

Figure 7 demonstrates the probability density distribution output of the Flight
Score in Verification Scenario 1. Results portrayed a mean risk score output of 1.781
indicating a safe level of flight operation under the specifications for the controllable
input variables with the outputs centered close to the mean; however, when compared to
the mean risk score output of the Maintenance Score, the Flight Score output is slightly
riskier.
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Figure 8. Probability density distribution of the Damage & Related Impact Score in
Verification Scenario 1.

Figure 8 reveals the probability density distribution output of the Damage and
Related Impact Score in Verification Scenario 1. The mean risk score output for the
Damage & Related Impact Score was 0.084 indicating a safe operation. The erratic shape
of the distribution is due to the infrequency of NTSB reports, FAA incident reports,
unscheduled maintenance events greater than $10,000, and a static Impact Value of 1
indicating no accidents or incidents. However, these values were assigned high weights
due to their importance within the system. The combination of infrequent occurrence and
high weighted values produced the erratic distribution of the Damage & Related Impact
Score.
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Figure 9. Probability density distribution of the Overall Risk Score in Verification
Scenario 1.

Figure 9 shows the probability density distribution output of the Overall Risk
Score in Verification Scenario 1. Results portrayed a mean overall risk score output of
1.015, indicating a safe level of the overall operation under the specifications for the
controllable input variables.
To ensure no programming error occurred, two additional Verification Scenarios
were performed using different controllable input variables. Verification Scenario 2 was
conducted using the range lows as values for the controllable input variables. Verification
Scenario 3 utilized the range highs as values for the controllable input variables. The
controllable input variables used in Verification Scenarios 2 and 3 can be found in Table
13.
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Table 13
Verification Scenarios 2 and 3 Controllable Input Values
Controllable Input
AMTs available

Verification Scenario 2
Value
14

Verification Scenario 3
Value
35

Aircraft available

50

82

Active flight students

335

1300

Full-time instructor pilots (Ips)

100

200

Note. Source: Operational range highs and lows; Sample: 10,000; Random seed: 99

The results, depicted as risk score outputs for the Maintenance Score, Flight
Score, Damage and Related Impact Score, and the Overall Risk Score, is depicted in
Tables 14 and 15. Overall, the model produced the results expected based on the
controllable input variable specifications. The individual outputs for each uncontrollable
input variable, SPI comparison outputs, and standardized SPI outputs from Verification
Scenarios 2 and 3 can be found in Appendix B (Tables B1-6) and C (Figures C1-8).
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Table 14
Verification Scenario 2: Risk Score Output Comparisons
Model
Max

Manual Calculation
Min
Max

Risk Score Output
Min
Mean
Maintenance
1.168
3.006
1.667
0.9272
1.7378
Score
Flight Score
0.9561
3.301
1.616
1.3347
2.0705
Damage &
Related Impact
0
0.4197
0.084
0
0.3349
Score
Overall Risk Score
0.7321
1.628
1.021
0.7854
1.1698
Note. The mean model output values fall within the minimum and maximum ranges
manually calculated based on the raw data, verifying the model’s calculations produced
viable output values.

Table 15
Verification Scenario 3: Risk Score Output Comparisons
Model
Manual Calculation
Risk Score Output
Min
Max
Mean
Min
Max
Maintenance
0.66
2.387
1.106
0.9272
1.7378
Score
Flight Score
1.284
3.629
1.944
1.3347
2.0705
Damage &
Related Impact
0
0.4197
0.084
0
0.3349
Score
Overall Risk Score
0.6828
1.517
0.9486
0.7854
1.1698
Note. The mean model output values fall within the minimum and maximum ranges
manually calculated based on the raw data, verifying the model’s calculations produced
viable output values.

Reliability Testing
Monte Carlo simulation modeling uses randomly selected numbers from
predetermined probability distributions to produce data outputs in the form of probability
distributions to account for the uncertainty inherent to the 22 uncontrollable input
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variables. Testing was conducted across multiple trials using various random number
generator seed values to ensure the results remained consistent across trials. The mean
probability output represents the forecasted level of operational risk on a standardized 0-5
risk scale for the Flight Score, Maintenance Score, Damage and Related Impact, and an
Overall Risk Score representative of the operation as a whole over 10,000 trials of the
simulation model.
The model was tested using various numbers of trial iterations ranging from 10
trials up to 30,000 trials. Although the results varied, the results were nearly identical
after 10,000 trials for a given test. Ultimately, this study used 10,000 trials. To evaluate
the reliability of the model, the study compared the results of three different iterative runs
of the model—each using a unique seed value to ensure a different sample of random
numbers for the uncontrollable input variables. The controllable input values for the three
different runs of the model are the same as those used in Verification Scenario 1 (see
Table 8). Analyzing the output with different seed values allows for the model to be
verified for consistency in its results.
In each scenario, 10,000 trials were executed, and three arbitrarily selected
random number generator seed values were selected to ensure the model produced a
different set of random numbers across trials. The seed value determines the starting
position in the random number generation; thus, different seed values cause the software
to produce different samples of random numbers within the simulation. Using different
samples of random numbers tests the model to see if it produces consistent results
regardless of the starting point, or seed value.
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To reflect the operating conditions of a large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight
training organization, the values chosen for the four controllable input variables were
based on the mean values drawn from two years of operational flight and maintenance
data. Again, the values for the four controllable input variables are as follows:
•

Aviation maintenance technicians available: 22

•

Total aircraft in fleet: 56

•

Full-time instructor pilots: 138

•

Active flight students: 681

Table 16 depicts the results of the reliability testing using different seed values.
For each group of results, three different seed values generated three different samples of
random numbers. Thus, the model ran 10,000 trials, producing 10,000 results for each of
the three different samples of random numbers. Table 16 also shows the mean and
standard deviation of the outputs for each of these runs. No significant differences
appeared among the different sets of results indicating the results are statistically reliable.
This study used ANOVA to test for differences across the three groups (Hoyt, 1941). The
ANOVA F-statistic and P-value for each set of results can be found in Table 16.
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Table 16
Comparison of Results with Different Random Number Seed Values
Output
Maintenance
Score

Flight Score

Damage &
Related
Impact Score

Overall Risk
Score

Seed
Value

Mean

Standard
Deviation

ANOVA
F

ANOVA
P-value

99

1.49

0.1686

3.6446

0.3071

50
10

1.491
1.492

0.1606
0.1638

99
50
10

1.781
1.784
1.792

0.2627
0.2628
0.2692

81

0.0704

99

0.0835

0.0687

0.25

0.7048

50
10

0.0829
0.0833

0.0692
0.0680

99

1.015

0.0978

36

0.1051

50
1.016
0.0958
10
1.018
0.0986
Note. No significant differences appear among the different sets of results;
thus, the results are considered statistically reliable.

Assumptions for ANOVA were also tested. The large sample size of the
simulated data meets the normality assumption. Levene’s testing verified the satisfaction
of the homogeneity assumption. A non-significant Levene’s statistic test (p > 0.05)
indicates the homogeneity of variance among the test groups. As shown in Table 16, the
p-values for all cases are greater than 0.05, indicating there are no significant differences
among the three samples; therefore, the results produced by the model are statistically
reliable.
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Validity Testing
The challenge with establishing a formal comparison of results between this
model and the models developed in other studies is that no other studies directly address
the same research questions. Additionally, little work has been done in the realm of
predictive modeling specific to large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training
organizations. This research utilizes the validated equations drawn from the nonstatistical model developed by Anderson et al. (2020) for the mathematical inputs driving
the computational nodes, including the SPIs, the Flight Score, Maintenance Score,
Damage and Related Impact Score, and the Overall Risk Score, as the foundation to
develop the safety performance decision-making tool.
The peer-reviewed research conducted by Anderson et al. (2020) validated the
non-statistical model and associated equations via the use of Subject Matter Experts using
a standardized expert elicitation survey questionnaire. Expert elicitation was used to
establish inter-rater reliability for the assessment of SME evaluations. The Fleiss’ kappa
value was 0.0360, indicating a fair level of agreement among raters. Qualitative feedback
was solicited and SMEs were asked to provide any comments or feedback on the model
and equations driving the model to justify their rating scores. SMEs were in a high level
of agreement relative to the overall utility of the model in providing a quantitative
indicator of flight risk for large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organizations.
Thus, the equations driving the predictive, safety performance decision-making tool
developed in this dissertation have been previously validated through the peer-reviewed
research conducted by Anderson et al. (2020).
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Additionally, three Verification Scenarios of the model were conducted using the
validated equations determined by Anderson et al. (2020). Within Verification Scenario
1, the values selected to serve as controllable input variable values were determined by
calculating the mean value for each variable of the sample data. The purpose of using the
mean value of each variable from the sample data was to ensure the output of the model
was representative of the CFR Part 141 flight training organization’s true operating
conditions determined by the raw data sample. Whereas the values for the controllable
input variables in Verification Scenario 2 were drawn from the low values of the
operational ranges for CFR Part 141 flight training organizations, the controllable input
variables for Verification Scenario 3 were drawn from high operational range values.
High and low range values were selected to represent the varying operational capacities
of the target population. Demonstrating the capability of the model using a wide range of
available resources further enhances the validity of the findings.
Monte Carlo Simulation Results
To demonstrate the utility of the safety performance decision-making tool for
real-world use, the controllable input values used to generate the what-if scenarios within
the Monte Carlo simulation model were determined based on permutational variations of
ranges of normal operating conditions specific to CFR Part 141 flight training
organizations. These ranges can be found in Table 6. These permutations were conducted
by varying the level of personnel, including available aviation maintenance technicians
and instructor pilots, as low, moderate, or high. Similarly, permutations of resource
expenditures, including aircraft available and active flight students, were also varied by
degree of low, moderate, or high. Low values consisted of the lowest possible range
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values, moderate values consisted of the median value, and high range values consisted
of the highest value of the predetermined, true, operational ranges for a large, collegiate
CFR Part 141 flight training organization.
The Analytica software tool computed each trial using the specified controllable
input variables listed in Table 17, capturing the output from each trial in a separate results
matrix for each trial. This allowed the model to compute the risk score outputs, depicted
as probability results, for the controllable input values given for each simulation trial.

Table 17
Controllable Inputs for What-if Scenarios 1, 2, 3, and 4
What-if
Scenario
Scenario 1

Controllabl
e Input
AMTs
Aircraft
IPs
Students

Scenario 2

Scenario 3

Scenario 4

Value

Description

14
82
100
1300

Low personnel, high expenditures

AMTs
Aircraft
IPs
Students

22
82
138
1300

Moderate personnel, high expenditures

AMTs
Aircraft
IPs
Students

35
50
200
335

High personnel, low expenditures

AMTs
35
High personnel, moderate expenditures
Aircraft
56
IPs
200
Students
681
Note. AMTs = Aviation maintenance technicians; Aircraft = Aircraft available; IPs=
Full-time instructor pilots; Students = Active flight students.
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Table 18
Results of What-if Scenarios 1, 2, 3 and 4
What-if
Scenario
Scenario 1

Scenario 2

Scenario 3

Scenario 4

Output

Mean (M)

Maintenance Score
Flight Score
Damage & Related
Impact Score
Overall Risk Score

1.39
2.621

Standard
Deviation (SD)
0.1683
0.2566

0.0835

0.0687

1.237

0.0967

1.283
2.248

0.1578
0.2566

0.0835

0.0687

1.092

0.0951

1.396
1.441

0.1601
0.2566

0.0835

0.0687

0.8845

0.0955

1.317
1.621

0.1563
0.2566

0.0835

0.0687

0.9149

0.0949

Maintenance Score
Flight Score
Damage & Related
Impact Score
Overall Risk Score
Maintenance Score
Flight Score
Damage & Related
Impact Score
Overall Risk Score
Maintenance Score
Flight Score
Damage & Related
Impact Score
Overall Risk Score

What-if Scenario 1 was conducted with the intent of simulating a scenario where
personnel, including AMTs and instructor pilots, are low, but the necessary expenditures,
including aircraft and active flight students, are high. The probability density distribution
output for What-if Scenario 1 can be found in Figures 10, 11, 12, and 13. Based on the
specific controllable input variables used, results indicated What-if Scenario 1 had the
highest mean value for the Overall Risk Score and the Flight Score, indicating a higher
level of operational risk associated with conditions where a flight instructor capacity of
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100 full-time instructors is not adequate to meet the demands of 1300 flight students,
increasing the level of operational risk, specifically in the flight department. Although
this is intuitive, it demonstrates the utility of the model for real-world use.

Figure 10. Probability density distribution of the Maintenance Score in What-if Scenario
1.

Figure 11. Probability density distribution of the Flight Score in What-if Scenario 1.
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Figure 12. Probability density distribution of the Damage and Related Impact Score in
What-if Scenario 1. Output scores between -1 and 0 are representative of occurrences in
which there were no incidents to report.

Figure 13. Probability density distribution of the Overall Risk Score in What-if Scenario
1.

What-if Scenario 2 was conducted with the intent of simulating a scenario similar
to What-if Scenario 1; however, in What-if Scenario 2, the number of personnel,
including AMTs and instructor pilots, was increased from 14 AMTs to 22 and 100
instructor pilots to 138. The expenditures, consisting of aircraft and active flight students,
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remained high. The probability density distribution output for What-if Scenario 2 can be
found in Figures 14, 15, 16, and 17. Intuitively, both the Flight and Maintenance Scores
improved from What-if Scenarios 1 to 2 indicating a reduction in the level of operational
risk by closing the gap between the number of instructor pilots and active flight students,
thus lowing the Overall Risk Score. The lowest Maintenance Score occurred in What-if
Scenario 2 indicating the ratio of 22 technicians to 82 aircraft is optimal.

Figure 14. Probability density distribution of the Maintenance Score in What-if Scenario
2.
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Figure 15. Probability density distribution of the Flight Score in What-if Scenario 2.

Figure 16. Probability density distribution of the Damage and Related Impact Score in
What-if Scenario 2.

Figure 17. Probability density distribution of the Overall Risk Score in What-if Scenario
2.

What-if Scenario 3 was conducted with the intent of simulating a scenario
opposite of What-if Scenarios 1 and 2 where there is an excess of personnel and a low
level of expenditures, including a low number of flight students and few aircraft
available. The probability density distribution output for What-if Scenario 3 can be found
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in Figures 18, 19, 20, and 21. The excess of personnel drove the Maintenance Score up
from the previous trials indicating an excess of available maintenance technicians
increased the level of risk within the maintenance department, negatively impacting
safety. The Flight Score was the lowest in What-if Scenario 3 indicating a 1:1 ratio of
instructor pilots to flight students is optimal. Of all four What-if Scenarios, What-if
Scenario 3 had the lowest Overall Risk Score (M = 0.8845, SD = 0.0955) indicating the
safest level of operating conditions compared to the other three trials.

Figure 18. Probability density distribution of the Maintenance Score in What-if Scenario
3.
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Figure 19. Probability density distribution of the Flight Score in What-if Scenario 3.

Figure 20. Probability density distribution of the Damage and Related Impact Score in
What-if Scenario 3.

87

Figure 21. Probability density distribution of the Overall Risk Score in What-if Scenario
3.

Finally, What-if Scenario 4 was conducted with the intent of simulating a scenario
similar to What-if Scenario 3; however, in regard to the expenditures, aircraft was
increased from 50 to 56, and the number of flight students was increased from 335 to
681. The amount of available personnel remained high. The probability density
distribution output for What-if Scenario 4 can be found in Figures 22, 23, 24, and 25.
Within What-if Scenario 4, the Flight Score increases from 1.441 to 1.621 indicating the
level of risk increases as the gap between the number of personnel and expenditures
closes.
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Figure 22. Probability density distribution of the Maintenance Score in What-if Scenario
4.

Figure 23. Probability density distribution of the Flight Score in What-if Scenario 4.
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Figure 24. Probability density distribution of the Damage and Related Impact Score in
What-if Scenario 4.

Figure 25. Probability density distribution of the Overall Risk Score in What-if Scenario
4.

Table 19 depicts a comparison of the mean scores and standard deviations for
What-if Scenarios 1, 2, 3, and 4 to compare the mean risk score outputs demonstrating
how changes to the inputs lead to differences in the risk score outputs. Figures 26, 27,
and 28 depict visual comparisons of the risk score outputs for What-if Scenarios 1, 2, 3,
and 4 categorized by maintenance, flight, and overall risk score outputs. The x-axis
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displays the risk score outputs for the model across scenarios, and the y-axis represents
the probability of occurrence in percentages.

Table 19
What-if Scenario Comparisons

Output Score
Maintenance
Flight
Damage &
Related
Impact
Overall Risk

What-if
Scenario 1
M (SD)
1.39 (0.17)
2.621 (0.26)

What-if
Scenario 2
M (SD)
1.283(0.16)
2.248 (0.26)

What-if
Scenario 3
M (SD)
1.396(0.16)
1.441 (0.26)

What-if
Scenario 4
M (SD)
1.317 (0.16)
1.621 (0.26)

0.084 (0.07)

0.084 (0.07)

0.084 (0.07)

0.084 (0.07)

1.237 (0.10)

1.092 (0.10)

0.8845 (0.10)

0.9149 (0.09)

Maintenance Score What-if Scenario Comparisons
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.8 4 4.2 4.4 4.6 4.8 5

Risk Score Output
MX Scenario 1

MX Scenario 2

MX Scenario 3

MX Scenario 4

Figure 26. Maintenance Score What-if Scenario Comparison Chart
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Results indicate the lowest risk score for maintenance occurred in What-if
Scenario 2, where the level of personnel was moderate, yet expenditures, including
aircraft and students, were high.

Flight Score What-if Scenario Comparisons
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%

0%
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.8 4 4.2 4.4 4.6 4.8 5

Risk Score Output
FLT Scenario 1

FLT Scenario 2

FLT Scenario 3

FLT Scenario 4

Figure 27. Flight Score What-if Scenario Comparison Chart

The lowest risk score for flight occurred in What-if Scenario 3, where the level of
personnel was high, and expenditures were low. The Damage and Related Impact Score
remained consistent throughout; thus, no visual comparisons were made.
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Overall Risk Score What-if Comparisons
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Figure 28. Overall Risk Score What-if Scenario Comparison Chart

What-if Scenario 3 also had the lowest Flight Score and Overall Risk Score,
indicating operations are at the lowest level of risk when the level of personnel is high,
yet the amount of expenditures remains low. Although intuitive, this demonstrates the
real-world utility of the model.
A Generalized Sensitivity Analysis (GSA) was conducted using a one-factor-at-atime approach. The purpose of conducting a GSA was to locate sensitive parameters, or
those that have the greatest effect on the model, and non-sensitive parameters, or those
input variables causing stagnation of the model. Findings of the GSA indicated a lack of
sensitivity within the Damage and Related Impact Score. This may be partially due to the
Impact Factor feeding into the model as a constant variable with a definition of 1, chosen
to represent a scenario where no damage and no injuries have occurred. Due to the
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obscurity of accidents in CFR Part 141 flight training operations; injuries, fatalities, and
the extent of damage are situationally specific and thus challenging variables to predict.
Due to this, a constant of 1 was used, indicating no injuries and no damage to people or
property occurred to demonstrate model utility. However, the sensitivity of Overall Risk
Score output did not change by removing the Impact Value constant variable.
To improve the overall sensitivity of the model, What-if Scenarios 1, 2, 3, and 4
were rerun as Sensitivity Trial Scenarios 1, 2, 3, and 4 with the Damage and Related
Impact Score pathway removed. However, removing the Damage and Related Impact
Score and associated input variables also required an adaption to the Overall Risk Score
equation and model weights. The adapted equation for the Overall Risk Score is
portrayed below. The model weights for Maintenance and Flight were changed from 0.3
to 0.5 to accommodate the removal of the Damage and Related Impact score, which had a
weight of 0.4.

(𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 ∗ 0.5) + (𝐹𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 ∗ 0.5)

Figure 29 depicts the conceptual layout of the model in Analytica with the
Damage and Related Impact Score pathway and associated input variables removed to
determine if the sensitivity of the model improves. Results of Sensitivity Trial Scenarios
1, 2, 3, and 4 can be found in Table 20.
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Figure 29. Conceptual layout of the model in Analytica for sensitivity analysis.

Table 20
Results of Sensitivity Trial Scenarios 1, 2, 3, and 4
Maintenance Score
M (SD)
1.39 (0.17)
1.39 (0.17)

Flight Score
M (SD)
2.621 (0.26)
2.621 (0.26)

Overall Risk Score
M (SD)
1.237 (0.10)

What-if Scenario 2
Sensitivity Trial
Scenario 2

1.283(0.16)
1.283(0.16)

2.248 (0.26)
2.248 (0.26)

1.092 (0.10)

What-if Scenario 3
Sensitivity Trial
Scenario 3

1.396(0.16)
1.396(0.16)

1.441 (0.26)
1.441 (0.26)

0.8845 (0.10)

What-if Scenario 4
Sensitivity Trial
Scenario 4

1.317 (0.16)
1.317 (0.16)

1.621 (0.26)
1.621 (0.26)

0.9149 (0.09)

Scenario
What-if Scenario 1
Sensitivity Trial
Sceanrio 1

2.005 (0.15)

1.765 (0.15)

1.419 (0.15)

1.469 (0.15)

95
Overall, results of the Sensitivity Trial Scenarios indicated that removing the
Damage and Related Impact Score pathway did little to improve the sensitivity of the
model. As demonstrated in Table 20, removing the Damage and Related Impact Score
pathway only impacts the Overall Risk Score. However, with this pathway removed, the
Overall Risk Score outputs are slightly higher, capturing an increased level of risk than
they had been within the What-if Scenarios.
Removing the Damage and Related Impact Score pathway restricts the utility of
the model by failing to account for the key variables included by Anderson et al. (2020)
in the non-statistical model due to its value in depicting the overall level risk associated
with the operation at a particular given time. The Damage and Related-Impact variable,
although reactive in nature and challenging to accurately forecast, provides an external
perception of the risk associated with the whole operation and should remain a valuable
portion of the safety decision-making tool.
Summary
Using Monte Carlo simulation, a safety decision-making tool was developed to
assess how changes to the controllable input variables impact the level of operational risk
within a large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organization. Before model
execution, input nodes supplying distribution data were examined to ensure the output
produced by the model aligns with the predetermined probability distributions of the
uncontrolled input variables, as determined by a two-year sample of raw operational
flight and maintenance data ranging from September 2017 to September 2019 from a
large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organization in the southeastern United
States. The output of each computational node of the model was verified by comparing
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the node’s output to the results of manual calculations drawn from the two-year sample of
operational data. There were 22 uncontrollable inputs to the model.
For model verification purposes, the output of each of these distributions was
examined from a simulation run with 10,000 trials. Three Verification Scenarios were
conducted. The values for the controllable input variables in Verification Scenario 2 were
drawn from the low values of the operational ranges for CFR Part 141 flight training
organizations, and the controllable input variables for Verification Scenario 3 were drawn
from high operational range values. High and low range values were selected to represent
the varying operational capacities of the target population. To ensure no programming
error occurred during the construction of the model, two additional Verification Scenarios
were performed using different controllable input variables.
Reliability Testing was performed using different random number generator seed
values to verify the model produced consistent results. The study compared the output
from three different runs of the model—each using a unique seed value to ensure a
different sample of random numbers for the uncontrollable input variables, which
remained the same across trials. Based on the results of ANOVA output, no significant
differences appeared among the different sets of results, indicating the results are
statistically reliable.
This research utilizes the validated equations drawn from the non-statistical model
developed by Anderson et al. (2020) for the mathematical inputs driving the
computational nodes, including the SPIs, the Flight Score, Maintenance Score, Damage
and Related Impact Score, and the Overall Risk Score, as the foundation to develop the
safety performance decision-making tool. The peer-reviewed research conducted by
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Anderson et al. (2020) validated the non-statistical model and associated equations via
the use of Subject Matter Experts using a standardized expert elicitation survey
questionnaire. Thus, the equations driving the predictive, safety performance decisionmaking tool developed in this dissertation have been previously validated through the
peer-reviewed research conducted by Anderson et al. (2020).
What-if Scenarios 1, 2, 3, and 4 were conducted to demonstrate the utility of the
safety performance decision-making tool for real-world use. The controllable input
values used to generate the what-if scenarios within the Monte Carlo simulation model
were determined based on permutational variations of the ranges of normal operating
conditions for the target population − large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training
organizations. Each what-if scenario ran the model through 10,000 trials to generate the
output datasets. Comparison of the four trials effectively demonstrated the utility and
potential for the safety performance decision-making tool.
Results of the GSA indicated that removing the Damage and Related Impact
Score pathway does improve the sensitivity of the model; however, the improvement is
very minor. Removing the Damage and Related Impact Score pathway restricts the utility
of the model by failing to account for the key variables included by Anderson et al.
(2020) in the non-statistical model due to its value in depicting the overall level of risk
associated with the operation at a particular given time.
.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter discusses the results described in Chapter IV and addresses the
research questions from Chapter I. This chapter examines the data produced by the
simulation model developed for this study, discusses the analysis of the data, and
identifies the study’s conclusions. Finally, this chapter discusses the limitations of the
study and provides recommendations for future research.
The purpose of the research was to create and validate a safety performance
decision-making tool to transform a non-statistical model composed of 12 SPIs
determined by Anderson, Aguiar, Truong, Friend, Williams, and Dickson (2020) to be
most indicative of flight risk specific to 14 CFR Part 141 flight training organizations into
a predictive, safety performance decision-making tool. The model uses what-if scenarios
to evaluate how changing controllable input variables affect the level of operational risk
within the system, portrayed within the model as the risk score outputs.
The study derived the outputs, or risk scores, from a Monte Carlo simulation
model. A Monte Carlo simulation accounts for the uncertainties present within the realworld operating conditions of a complex, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training
organization. The model created for this study produced probability distribution output
data to provide critical, safety decision-making information on the level of operational
risk associated with manipulating the following controllable input variables: number of
aviation maintenance technicians available, number of aircraft available, number of fulltime instructor pilots, and the number of active flight students. The data driving the
distributions for the uncontrollable input variables found in Table 3 were drawn from a
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two-year sample of operational flight and maintenance data from a large, collegiate CFR
Part 141 flight training organization in the southeastern United States.
Discussion
To effectively create and validate a safety decision-making tool, it was first
necessary to define both the scenarios and the input values to be used by the model. Since
this study focused on creating a model specific to large, collegiate Title 14 CFR Part 141
flight training organizations, the selected permutational scenarios intended to represent
the vast range of operating conditions for collegiate, 14 CFR Part 141 flight training
organizations. The probability distributions used for the uncontrollable input variables
were also drawn from the same two-year sample of operational flight and maintenance
data from a large, collegiate flight training organization in the southeastern United States.
Thus, the risk score outputs of the model are specific to the operating conditions of the
particular CFR Part 141 flight training organization used within the sample. However, the
equations driving the predictive model have been validated in the peer-reviewed literature
by Anderson et al. (2020) indicating the model could easily be adapted for immediate use
by any collegiate, Title 14 CFR Part 141 flight training organization with data collection
capabilities and an active SMS by determining the appropriate uncontrollable input
distributions specific to that organization’s operating conditions.
The following section will address the research questions driving the study,
explain how findings are supported, and describe how the findings fit into the existing
body of knowledge surrounding predictive modeling for large, collegiate CFR Part 141
flight training organizations.
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Research Question 1: How can the SPI model developed by Anderson, Aguiar,
Truong, Friend, Williams, and Dickson (2020) be transformed into a predictive,
safety performance decision-making tool with the ability to run what-if scenarios?
To address Research Question 1, this dissertation outlines the process of
transforming a non-statistical risk assessment model developed by Anderson et al. (2020)
composed of 12 domain-specific SPIs and associated equations into a predictive, safety
performance decision-making tool using a two-year sample of operational flight and
maintenance data from a large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organization in the
southeastern United States to determine uncontrollable input probability distributions and
demonstrate the utility of the model for real-world use. The safety performance decisionmaking tool created for this dissertation utilizes what-if scenarios to simulate how
changes to the four controllable input variables influence the risk scores, or outputs.
Documented within the first three sections in Chapter IV, verification, reliability,
and validity testing was either discussed or conducted on the safety performance
decision-making tool to ensure findings were supported. Using Analytica 64-bit
Educational Professional software Release 4.6.1.30 by Lumina Decision Systems, three
Verification Scenarios were run on the predictive model. Within Verification Scenario 1,
the values selected to serve as controllable input values were determined by calculating
the mean value for each variable based on the two-year sample of raw data. The purpose
of using mean values for comparison purposes was to ensure the output of the model was
representative of the raw sample data from the CFR Part 141 flight training organization.
The values of the controllable input variables in Verification Scenario 2 were drawn from
the low values of the operational ranges. Finally, values for the controllable input
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variables in Verification Scenario 3 were drawn from high operational range values for
CFR Part 141 flight training organizations. High and low range values were selected to
represent the varying operational capacities of the target population. Results indicated
that the simulation model’s mean output value fell between the higher and lower limits of
the raw data sample. Overall, the model produced the results expected based on the
controllable input variable specifications, effectively verifying the efficacy of the
transition from a non-statistical risk assessment model in a predictive, safety performance
decision-making tool.
To further support the findings, reliability testing was conducted on the output of
the simulation model. The outputs from three different runs of the model were
compared—each using 10,000 trials and a unique seed value to ensure a different sample
of random numbers for the uncontrollable input variables. Analyzing the output with
different seed values allows for the model to be verified for consistency in its results
despite the changes produced by the random number generator. Mean probability was the
key output for this model. The mean probability output represents the forecasted level of
operational risk on a standardized 0-5 risk scale for the Flight Score, Maintenance Score,
Damage and Related Impact Score, and Overall Risk Score. The results of the reliability
trials were analyzed using ANOVA to test for differences across the three groups (Hoyt,
1941). No significant differences appeared among the different sets of results indicating
the results are statistically reliable.
The challenge with results comparison between this model and the models
developed in other studies is that no other studies directly address the same research
questions. Additionally, little work has been done in the realm of predictive modeling
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specific to large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organizations, leaving a deficit of
validated models for comparison. However, this research utilized the peer-reviewed and
validated equations drawn from the non-statistical model developed by Anderson et al.
(2020) for the mathematical inputs driving the computational nodes, including the SPIs,
the Flight Score, Maintenance Score, Damage and Related Impact Score, and the Overall
Risk Score, as the foundation to develop the safety performance decision-making tool.
Research Question 2: How do changes to the controllable input variables impact
the overall risk score?
To address Research Question 2 and demonstrate the utility of the model for realworld use, distributions and ranges of values were utilized to simulate the many
thousands of potential outcomes within the what-if scenarios allowing for an assessment
of how the changes to the controllable input variables impact the risk scores. The
controllable input values used to generate the what-if scenarios within the Monte Carlo
simulation model were determined based on permutational variations of the range of
normal operating conditions specific to CFR Part 141 flight training organizations. These
permutations were conducted by varying the level of personnel, concerning available
aviation maintenance technicians and instructor pilots, as low, moderate, or high.
Similarly, permutations of resource expenditures, including aircraft available and active
flight students, were also varied by degree of low, moderate, or high. Low values
consisted of the lowest range values, moderate values consisted of the median value, and
high range values consisted of the highest potential value of the predetermined, true,
operational ranges for a large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organization.
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To support the findings and demonstrate the utility of the safety performance
decision-making tool, four What-if Scenarios were conducted by manipulating the
controllable input variables, or resources including personnel, students, and aircraft.
What-if Scenario 1 was run with the intent of simulating a scenario where personnel, with
regard to AMTs and instructor pilots, are low, but the necessary expenditures, consisting
of aircraft and active flight students, was high. Within What-if Scenario 2, the number of
personnel, including AMTs and instructor pilots, was increased from 14 AMTs to 22 and
100 instructor pilots to 138. The expenditures, consisting of aircraft and active flight
students, remained high. What-if Scenario 3 was conducted with the intent of simulating
a scenario opposite of What-if Scenarios 1 and 2 where there is an excess of personnel
and a low level of expenditures, including a low number of flight students and available
aircraft. Within What-if Scenario 4, the number of expenditures in terms of aircraft was
increased from 50 to 56, and the number of flight students was increased from 335 to
681. The amount of available personnel remained high.

Table 21
What-if Scenario Comparisons

Output Score
Maintenance
Flight
Damage &
Related
Impact
Overall Risk

What-if
Scenario 1
M (SD)
1.39 (0.17)
2.621 (0.26)

What-if
Scenario 2
M (SD)
1.283(0.16)
2.248 (0.26)

What-if
Scenario 3
M (SD)
1.396(0.16)
1.441 (0.26)

What-if
Scenario 4
M (SD)
1.317 (0.16)
1.621 (0.26)

0.084 (0.07)

0.084 (0.07)

0.084 (0.07)

0.084 (0.07)

1.237 (0.10)

1.092 (0.10)

0.8845 (0.10)

0.9149 (0.09)
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Table 21 depicts a comparison of What-if Scenarios 1, 2, 3, and 4, demonstrating
how changes to the inputs lead to differences in the risk score outputs. Results of the four
What-if Scenarios indicate the lowest risk score for maintenance occurred in What-if
Scenario 2, where the level of personnel was moderate, yet expenditures, concerning
aircraft and students, were high. The lowest risk score for flight occurred in What-if
Scenario 3, where the level of personnel was high, and expenditures were low. The
Damage and Related Impact Score remained consistent throughout. What-if Scenario 3
also had the lowest Flight Score and Overall Risk Score, indicating operations are at the
lowest level of risk and optimum level of safety among trials under the following
specifications:
•

Aviation Maintenance Technicians available: 35

•

Aircraft available: 50

•

Instructor Pilots: 200

•

Active Flight Students: 335

As demonstrated by the mean probability output data produced by the simulation
model, changes to the controllable input variables are reflected by variations to the risk
score outputs demonstrating the utility and potential for the safety performance decisionmaking tool. The risk score outputs produced from the what-if scenarios could then be
utilized by safety personnel and administration to make more informed safety-related
decisions, based on the mean level of operational risk predicted without expending
unnecessary resources. The lowest Overall Risk Score occurs in What-if Scenario 3,
indicating CFR Part 141 flight training organizations should strive to maintain an
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appropriate balance of high personnel to low expenditures to maintain the optimum level
of operational safety.
This research fits into the existing body of knowledge surrounding the area of
predictive aviation safety assessment techniques by providing detailed insight into the
process of transitioning from traditionally reactive SPIs into a safety performance
decision-making tool with forecasting abilities specific to large, collegiate CFR Part 141
flight training organizations. The extant literature indicated a deficit of these predictive,
domain-specific safety performance decision-making tools. Thus, this reusable model
pioneers the way for the inclusion of validated safety performance decision-making tools
into the risk management component of flight training organizations’ SMS.
Conclusions
This dissertation demonstrated the process of transitioning from a non-statistical
model composed of domain-specific, yet reactive, SPIs into a safety performance
decision-making tool with forecasting abilities for safety decision-making purposes,
specific to CFR Part 141 flight training organizations improving the risk management
component of CFR Part 141 flight training organizations’ Safety Management System
(SMS). Figure 5 illustrates the conceptual layout and structural definitions of the model
in Analytica from Lumina Decision Systems. ANOVA testing found no significant
differences between sets of results, indicating the model is statistically reliable. As the
mathematical inputs driving the computational nodes, or SPIs, are drawn from peerreviewed and previously validated research conducted by Anderson et al. (2020), the
model is considered valid. Finally, What-if Scenarios 1, 2, 3, and 4 were conducted to
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effectively demonstrate the utility of the safety performance decision-making tool in
influencing the risk score outputs.
Theoretical contributions. This dissertation describes the process of
transforming a nonstatistical model composed of domain-specific SPIs into a safety
performance decision-making tool. It also extends the previously validated non-statistical
model composed of SPIs determined by Anderson et al. (2020) to be most indicative of
flight risk specific to large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organizations to create
a new, predictive, safety performance decision-making tool with the ability to run what-if
scenarios. Determining the probability distributions of the uncontrollable input variables
from the sample data allowed for the nonstatistical model to be transformed into a
predictive, safety performance decision-making tool.
The study demonstrates the utility of Monte Carlo simulation as a viable approach
for handling input parameters with varying levels of uncertainty to assist in
administrative, safety decision-making. Describing the potential outcomes as a range of
outcomes provides insight into how potential changes to controllable inputs affect the
level of risk within the system while acknowledging the results of actually making realworld changes to the system may vary due to the uncertainties involved.
The model will also provide a mechanism for expanding the breadth of
knowledge related to optimizing resources from both flight and maintenance operations
to enhance operational safety for CFR Part 141 flight training organizations. Further, a
thorough review of the extant literature indicated a gap in the process of transitioning
from traditionally reactive SPIs into safety performance decision-making tools with
forecasting abilities for safety decision-making purposes specific to large, collegiate CFR
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Part 141 flight training operations. With the literature indicating a deficit of a validated
safety decision-making tool specific to CFR Part 141 flight training operations, this
research has filled this gap by providing a validated, safety decision-making tool, specific
to CFR Part 141 operations, to advance the applications of proactive, rather than reactive,
aviation safety assessment techniques by modeling the potential of the system without
compromising resources.
Practical contributions. From a practical standpoint, this research will aid in
shaping the current understanding of the factors most substantially contributing to flight
risk within large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organizations, thereby
improving overall flight safety. As a safety decision-making tool, the model could also be
used by the administration within a large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training
organization to rationalize hiring, technology acquisition, and other safety-related
initiatives by modeling the potential of modifying resources, or controllable inputs,
without the risk associated with actually expending the organization’s resources.
With a consistent stream of data updated on a monthly basis, CFR Part 141 flight
training organizations could utilize this safety decision-making tool to understand the
impact altering the ratios of resources-to-expenditures has on the level of operational risk
present within the flight department, maintenance department, and the operation overall.
Results of the What-if Scenarios and Sensitivity Trial Scenarios indicated the trial with
the lowest risk scores was What-if Scenario 3 and Sensitivity Trial 3. In both trials, the
controllable input values were 35 AMTs to 50 aircraft and 200 full-time instructor pilots
to 335 flight students. Demonstrably, CFR Part 141 flight training organizations could
lower their levels of risk, thereby improving their overall safety, by maintaining
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conditions where there is enough personnel staffed to accommodate the level of
expenditures, including aircraft and active flight students.
For this dissertation, the data supplying the probability distributions for the
uncontrollable input variables are drawn from a two-year sample of operational data
ranging from 2017-2019 for a large, collegiate 14 CFR Part 141 flight training
organization. However, the model could be adapted for use in any CFR Part 141 flight
training organization with data acquisition capacities and an operational SMS simply by
modifying the input value probability distributions to reflect the operating conditions of
the selected 14 CFR Part 141 flight training organization. Providing collegiate CFR Part
141 flight training organizations with a safety decision-making tool will enhance the risk
management component of the operation’s SMS by taking an increasingly proactive
approach to safety by providing insight into the impact changes to operating conditions
may have on the safety of the overall operation determined by evaluating the quantitative
risk score outputs. The ability to forecast operating conditions using Monte Carlo
simulation will allow CFR Part 141 flight training organizations to make better informed
safety-related decisions while optimizing efficiency without compromising safety.
Limitations of the Findings
The research was limited to the creation and validation of a safety performance
decision-making tool utilizing Monte Carlo simulation to transform a non-statistical
model composed of the ten SPIs determined by Anderson et al. (2020) into a predictive,
safety decision-making tool capable of running what-if scenarios to determine how
changes to input variables affect the levels of operational risk within the organization.
The variables used in this model are limited to those found to be most relevant to

109
measuring flight risk in a large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organization by
SMEs in the areas of both flight and maintenance (Anderson et al., 2020). The four
controllable input variables selected for use in the simulation are just four pieces of a
large and complex system. As demonstrated within What-if Scenarios 1-4, manipulating
these controllable inputs does not drastically impact the risk score outputs, as the ranges
of normal operating conditions used to determine the values for the controllable input
variables may have not been broad enough to capture more dynamic variations to the risk
score outputs.
Recommendations
The results of this study demonstrated the creation and validation of a safety
performance decision-making tool. The safety performance decision-making tool should
be utilized by safety personnel and administrators to make more informed safety-related
decisions, based on the level of risk predicted by the manipulation of controllable input
variables within the what-if scenarios, without expending unnecessary organizational
resources.
Recommendations for large, collegiate 14 CFR Part 141 flight training
organizations. Large, collegiate 14 CFR Part 141 flight training organizations should
improve and streamline their operational data collection capabilities and storage to ensure
the model is provided with accurate data to determine the uncontrollable input probability
distributions. Additionally, 14 CFR Part 141 flight training organizations should utilize a
larger sample of raw operational flight and maintenance data to ensure the accuracy of
the probability distributions for the uncontrollable inputs and the predictive utility of the
model. Finally, large, collegiate 14 CFR Part 141 flight training organizations should
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explore the potential of utilizing different controllable input variables for use within the
model.
CFR Part 141 flight training organizations could utilize this safety decisionmaking tool to run what-if scenarios to understand the impact of altering the quantity of
resources and expenditures, with regard to the number of AMTs available, the number of
aircraft available, the number of full-time instructor pilots, and the number of active
flight students and the influence these changes make on the level of operational risk for
the flight department, maintenance department, and the operation overall. CFR Part 141
flight training organizations could also use the model to determine an acceptable level of
risk particular to their operation based on the manipulation of resources. Results of the
model, based on the probability distributions drawn from a two-year sample of
operational data, indicated the trial with the lowest risk scores occurred when there is
enough personnel staffed to accommodate a low level of expenditures. In both trials, the
controllable input values were 35 AMTs to 50 aircraft and 200 instructor pilots to 335
flight students simulating a scenario where the level of personnel is high but expenditures
are low. To reduce the level of overall risk within the organization, CFR Part 141 flight
training organizations should evaluate their current ratios of AMTs to aircraft and
instructor pilots to flight students to maintain an optimized level of balance and direct
financial resources to accommodate an operation where the level of personnel is high yet
expenditures are low.
Recommendations for future research. Future research should focus on
opportunities to further explore both the capabilities of the model and options for
improving the accuracy of the model’s predictions. The ranges of normal operating
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conditions used to determine the values for the controllable input variables may have not
been broad enough to capture the potential for more dynamic variations to the risk score
outputs. Future research could focus on expanding the range of operational values when
determining controllable input variables to assess how changes to the risk score outputs
are impacted with a more expansive range of operating conditions.
In an attempt to increase the predictive potential of the model, future research
should reevaluate the Damage and Related Impact variable, as it is composed of variables
that are reactive in nature, making this SPI challenging to predict. Increasing the
predictive accuracy of the Damage and Related Impact variable may increase the
sensitivity of the Overall Risk Score output. Future research should also explore the
potential of including additional controllable input variables, thereby leaving less up to
chance. Future research should aim to improve the overall utility of the model for 14 CFR
Part 141 flight training organizations by incorporating clear, measurable human
performance variables into the model, assuming the data is available. To enhance the
robustness of the model, future research should consider incorporating the three
indicators (NAC, Weather, and ATC Delay), included in the original model by Anderson
et al. (2020), due to their potential correlations with the SPIs and their unpredictable
influence on day-to-day flight operations.
Additionally, future research should explore the potential of incorporating
machine learning techniques to allow for the data supplying the probability distributions
for the uncontrolled input variables to be updated on a regular basis eliminating the need
to manually update the distributions. This will improve the accuracy and predictive
capabilities of the model. As monte carlo simulation can be used to quantify risk, future
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research should also consider the alternative approach of utilizing optimization
techniques to further minimize risk.
Summary
The purpose of the dissertation was to create and validate a safety performance
decision-making tool to transform a reactive safety model into a predictive, safety
performance decision-making tool, specific to large, collegiate Title 14 CFR Part 141
flight training organizations, to increase safety and aid in operational decision-making.
The validated safety decision-making tool uses what-if scenarios to assess how changes
to the controllable input variables impact the overall level of operational risk within an
organization’s flight department.
SPIs from the non-statistical SPI model developed by Anderson et al. (2020) were
used to create the safety performance decision-making tool, as these SPIs are most
indicative of operational flight risk for a 14 CFR Part 141 flight training organization.
However, a 14 CFR flight training organization could utilize its own unique SPIs by
determining the probability distributions of the uncontrollable input variables, further
enhancing the generalizability of the safety performance decision-making tool. Anderson
et al. (2020) created and validated, via expert elicitation a non-statistical model composed
of SPIs from both flight and maintenance operations and their relevant formulae based on
two years of operational flight and maintenance data. The SPIs from the non-statistical
model developed by Anderson et al. (2020) were used as the foundation to develop a
safety performance decision-making tool based on the input variables for the chosen
SPIs. Monte Carlo simulation was conducted and run to enable the SPI model to handle
uncertainty in some of the key, influential variables.
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As a safety decision-making tool, the model could also be used by the
administration within a large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training organization to
rationalize hiring, technology acquisition, and other safety-related initiatives by modeling
the potential of modifying resources, or controllable inputs, without the risk associated
with actually expending the organization’s resources. The model could also be adapted
for use in any flight training organization with data acquisition capabilities and an active
SMS.
The research methodology has been designed to address the following research
questions:
1. How can the SPI model developed by Anderson, Aguiar, Truong, Friend,
Williams, and Dickson (2020) be transformed into a predictive, safety
performance decision-making tool with the ability to run what-if scenarios?
2. How do changes to the controllable input variables impact the overall risk
performance score?
To address Research Question 1, Monte Carlo simulation was utilized to
transform the non-statistical risk assessment model composed of SPIs developed by
Anderson et al. (2020) into a predictive, safety performance decision-making tool. In
response to Research Question 2, distributions and ranges of values were utilized to
simulate the many thousands of potential outcomes within the what-if scenarios allowing
for an assessment of how the changes to the controllable input variables impact the
overall level of operational risk. After manipulating the controllable input variables, or
resources with regard to personnel, students, and aircraft, the probability distribution
output from the what-if scenarios then allows safety personnel and administration to
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make more informed safety-related decisions, based on the level of risk predicted by the
what-if scenarios, without expending unnecessary resources.
The target population to which the model generalizes is large, collegiate CFR Part
141 flight training organizations within the United States operating under the
specifications defined by the FAA within Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations
Part 141 (Federal Aviation Administration, 2017). The sampling frame consisted of twoyears of operational data from both flight and maintenance operations dating from
September 2017 to September 2019 for a large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training
organization in the southeastern United States. The sample data used to determine the
probability distributions of the uncontrollable input variables within the model was
comprised of two years of operational flight and maintenance data from a large,
collegiate 14 CFR Part 141 flight training organization in the southeastern United States.
To ensure simulation scenarios are representative of the target population, true
operational ranges representative of large, collegiate 14 CFR Part 141 flight training
organizations in the United States were used to enhance the generalizability of the model.
The study conducted simulation runs based on the true operational ranges to simulate the
range of operating conditions possible within large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight
training organizations with varying levels of resources regarding personnel (Aviation
Maintenance Technicians and Instructor Pilots), students, and aircraft.
The software utilized for the Monte Carlo simulation was Analytica Educational
Professional release 4.6.1.30 by Lumina Decisions Systems. Microsoft Excel 2013 was
used to process the data and to analyze and illustrate characteristics of the intermediate
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input data, or SPIs, generated by the algorithms in the Analytica model. Microsoft Excel
2013 was also used for post-hoc testing and analysis.
There are 22 uncontrolled inputs to the model specified as probability
distributions. Three Verification Scenarios were conducted. Reliability Testing was
performed with various numbers of trial runs and random number generator seed values
to ensure consistent results despite the changing random number generator. To test the
model reliability, the study compared the output from three different runs of the model—
each using a unique seed value to ensure a different sample of random numbers for the
uncontrollable input variables, which remained the same across trials. Based on the
results of ANOVA output, no significant differences appeared among the different sets of
results, indicating the results are statistically reliable.
The peer-reviewed research conducted by Anderson et al. (2020) validated the
non-statistical model and associated equations via the use of Subject Matter Experts using
a standardized expert elicitation survey questionnaire. Thus, the equations driving the
predictive, safety performance decision-making tool developed in this dissertation have
been previously validated through the peer-reviewed research conducted by Anderson et
al. (2020).
What-if Scenarios 1, 2, 3, and 4 were conducted to demonstrate the utility of the
safety performance decision-making tool for real-world use; the controllable input values
used to generate the what-if scenarios within the Monte Carlo simulation model were
determined based on permutational variations of the ranges of normal operating
conditions for the target population − large, collegiate CFR Part 141 flight training
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organizations. Comparison of the four trials effectively demonstrated the utility and
potential for the safety performance decision-making tool.
CFR Part 141 flight training organizations could utilize this safety decisionmaking tool to run what-if scenarios to understand the impact of altering the quantity of
resources and expenditures, in terms of the number of AMTs available, the number of
aircraft available, the number of full-time instructor pilots, and the number of active
flight students and the influence these changes make on the level of operational risk for
the flight department, maintenance department, and the operation overall. As the focus of
this dissertation was on the process of transforming a reactive model into a safety
performance decision-making tool, a 14 CFR flight training organization could utilize its
own unique SPIs by determining the probability distributions of the uncontrollable input
variables, further enhancing the generalizability of the safety performance decisionmaking tool.
CFR Part 141 flight training organizations could also use the model to determine
an acceptable level of risk particular to their operation based on the manipulation of
resources. Results of the model, based on the probability distributions drawn from a twoyear sample of operational data, indicated the trial with the lowest risk scores occurred
when there is enough personnel staffed to accommodate a moderate amount of
expenditures. In both trials, the controllable input values were 35 AMTs to 50 aircraft and
200 instructor pilots to 335 flight students simulating a scenario where the level of
personnel is high but expenditures are low. To reduce the level of overall risk within the
organization, CFR Part 141 flight training organizations should evaluate their current
ratios of AMTs to aircraft and instructor pilots to flight students to maintain an optimized
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level of balance and direct financial resources to accommodate an operation where the
level of personnel is high compared to expenditures.

118
REFERENCES
Adjekum, D. K. (2014). Safety culture perceptions in a collegiate aviation program: A
systematic assessment. Journal of Aviation Technology and Engineering, 3(2),
44-56.
Ale, B. J. M., Bellamy, L. J., Cooke, R. M., Goossens, L. H. J., Hale, A. R., Roelen, A. L.
C., & Smith, E. (2006). Towards a causal model for air transport safety – an
ongoing research project. Safety Science, 44, 657-673.
Anderson, C. L., Aguiar, M. D., Truong, D., Friend, M. A., Williams, J., & Dickson, M.
T. (2020). Development of a risk indicator score card for a large flight training
department. Safety Science, 131, 1-11.
Ayres, D., Schmutte, J. S., & Stanfield, J. (2017). Expect the unexpected: Risk
assessment using Monte Carlo simulations. Journal of Accountancy. Retrieved
from https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2017/nov/risk-assessmentusing-monte-carlo-simulations.html
Barlow, J. (2009). Simplification: Ethical implications for simulation. Paper presented at
the 18th World IMACS/MODSIM Congress. Cairns, Australia. 13-17 July 2009.
Bastos, L. C. M. (2005). Risk management model for on-demand Part 135 (air taxi)
operators (Unpublished master’s thesis). University of Central Missouri.
Belkhouche, F. (2013). Modeling and calculating the collision risk for air vehicles. IEEE
Transactions on Vehicular Technology, 62(5), 2031-2041.
Blair, E. (2017). Strategic safety measures: Seven key benefits. Professional Safety,
62(2), 32-39.
Careddu, L., Costantino, F., & Di Gravio, G. (2008). Simulation model of airport runway
incursions. Proceedings of the 20th European Modeling & Simulation
Symposium, 243-248.
Cassens, R. E. (2010). Elements related to teaching pilots aeronautical decision making
(Unpublished master’s thesis). Purdue University.
Cassens, R. E. (2015). The effectiveness of behavior-based safety in the flight training
environment (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Purdue University.
Chen, C. F., & Chen, S. C. (2014). Measuring the effects of safety management system
practices, morality leadership and self-efficacy on pilots’ safety behaviors:
Safety motivation as a mediator. Safety Science, 62, 376–385.

119
Chen, W., & Jing, L. (2016). Safety performance monitoring and measurement of civil
aviation unit. Journal of Air Transport Management, 57, 228-233.
Cox, S. J., & Cox, T. R. (1991). The structure of employee attitudes to safety: an
European example. Work & Stress, 5, 93-106.
Dakwat, A. L., & Villani, E. (2018). System safety assessment based on STPA and model
checking. Safety Science, 109, 130-143.
Dekker, S. (2011). Drift into Failure: From hunting broken components to understanding
complex systems. CRC Press.
Di Gravio, G., Mancini, M., Patriarca, R., & Costantino, F. (2015). Overall safety
performance of air traffic management system: Forecasting and monitoring.
Safety Science, 72, 351-362. doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2014.10.003
Dunn, W., & Schultis, J. K. (2011). Exploring Monte Carlo Methods (1st ed.). Elsevier
Publishing.
Dyhrberg, M. B., & Jensen, P. L. (2004). Organizations in context: Proposal for a new
theoretical approach in prescriptive accident research. Safety Science, 42(10),
961-977.
EUROCONTROL. (2009). Reporting and assessment of safety occurrences. ATMESARR2. Retrieved from https://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/268.pdf
European Union Aviation Safety Agency. (2016). Flight data monitoring on ATR
aircraft. ATR Training Center. Retrieved from https://www.easa.europa.
eu/sites/default/files/dfu/16T0153_ATR_FDM_2016.pdf
Faghih-Roohi, S., Xie, M., & Ng, K. M. (2014). Accident risk assessment in marine
transportation via Markov modelling and Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation.
Ocean Engineering, 91, 363-370.
Farrance, I., & Frenkel, R. (2014). Uncertainty in measurement: A review of Monte Carlo
simulation using Microsoft Excel for the calculation of uncertainties through
functional relationships, including uncertainties in empirically derived constants.
Clinical Biochemical Review, 35(1), 37-61.
Federal Aviation Administration. (2016). Order 8000.369B Safety Management System.
U.S. Department of Transportation. Retrieved from https://www.faa.gov/
documentLibrary/media/Order/FAA_Order_8000.369B.pdf
Federal Aviation Administration. (2017). Advisory Circular 141-1B. Retrieved from
https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_141-1B.pdf

120
Frijters, A., & Swuste, P. (2011). How to measure safety in construction industry. Paper
presented at the National Occupational Injury Research Symposium, Washington,
DC.
Gunduz, M., Birgonul, M. T., & Ozdemir, M. (2017). Fuzzy structural equation model to
assess construction site safety performance. Journal of Construction Engineering
and Management, 143(4), 1-16.
Hacura, A., Jadamus-Hacura, M., & Kocot, A. (2001). Risk Analysis in investment
appraisal based on the Monte Carlo simulation technique. The European Physical
Journal B- Condensed Matter and Complex Systems, 20(4), 551-553.
Hadjimichael, M. (2009). A fuzzy expert system for aviation risk assessment. Expert
Systems with Applications, 36, 6512-6519.
Hoyt, C. (1941). Test reliability estimated by analysis of variance. Psychometrika, 6(3),
153-160.
Insua, D. R., Alfaro, C., Gomez, J., Hernandez-Coronado, P., & Bernal, F. (2019).
Forecasting and assessing consequences of aviation safety occurrences. Safety
Science, 111, 243-252.
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). (2013). ICAO safety management
manual (4th ed.). ICAO.
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). (2013b). Annex 19 to the Convention
on International Civil Aviation, Safety Management (1st ed.). ICAO.
Jackman, F. (2018). Safety performance indicators. Flight Safety Foundation. Retrieved
from https://flightsafety.org/asw-article/safety-performance-indicators/
Jacquemart, D., & Morio, J. (2013). Conflict probability estimation between aircraft with
dynamic importance splitting. Safety Science, 51(1), 94-100. doi:10.1016/j.ssci.
2012.05.010
Janicak, C. (2015). Safety metrics: Tools and techniques for measuring safety
performance (3rd ed.). Bernan Press.
Jepperson, R. L. (1991). Institutions, institutional effects, and institutionalism. The New
Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, 6, 143-163.
Keller, J. (2015). Unexpected transition from VFR to IMC: An examination of training
protocols to mitigate pilot gaps in knowledge and performance (Unpublished
doctoral dissertation). Purdue University.

121
Leung, F. H., & Savithiri, R. (2009). Spotlight on focus groups. Canadian Family
Physician, 55(2), 218-219.
Lu, C. T., Wetmore, M., & Przetak, R. (2006). Another approach to enhance airline
safety: Using management safety tools. Journal of Air Transportation, 11(2),
113–139.
Lumina Decision Systems, Inc. (2015). Analytica user guide – Analytica 4.6. Retrieved
from http://downloads.analytica.com/ana/UserGuide4_6_1.pdf
Makino, H., McKenna, S. A., & Wakasugi, K. (2001). Sensitivity analysis of Monte
Carlo simulation results using Kolomogrov-Smirnov d statistic. Proceedings of
the International Association of Mathematical Geology 2001 Annual Meeting, 116.
Mendonca, F. A. C., & Carney, T. Q. (2017). A safety management model for FAR 141
approved flight schools. Journal of Aviation Technology and Engineering, 6(2),
33-49.
Netjasov, F., Crnogorac, D., & Pavlović, G. (2019). Potential safety occurrences as
indicators of air traffic management safety performance: A network based
simulation model. Transportation Research Part C, 102, 490-508.
doi:10.1016/j.trc.2019.03.026
Oswald, D., Zhang, R. P., Lingard, H., Payam, P., & Tiendung, L. (2018). The use and
abuse of safety indicators in construction. Engineering, Construction, and
Architectural Management, 25(9), 1188-1209.
Panagopoulos, I., Atkin, C., & Sikora, I. (2017). Development of performance indicators
lean-sigma framework for measuring aviation system’s safety performance.
Transportation Research Procedia, 22, 35-44.
Papadopoulos, C. E., & Yeung, H. (2001). Uncertainty estimation and Monte Carlo
simulation method. Flow Measurement and Instrumentation, 12, 291-298.
Patriarca, R., Di Gravio, G., Cioponea, R., & Licu, A. (2019). Safety intelligence:
Incremental proactive risk management for holistic aviation safety performance.
Safety Science, 118, 551-567. doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2019.05.040
Pierobon, M. (2016). Unleashing SPIs. Flight Safety Foundation. Retrieved from
https://flightsafety.org/asw-article/unleashing-spis/
Reason, J. T. (1997). Managing the risks of organizational accidents (1st ed.). Ashgate.
doi:10.4324/9781315543543

122
Reiman, T., & Pietikäinen, E. (2010). Indicators of safety culture: Selection and
utilization of leading safety performance indicators. Strålsäkerhetsmyndigheten,
1-72.
Safety and Reliability Society. (n. d.). Chapter 4 Monte Carlo simulation. Applied R&M
manual for defence systems part D- supporting theory. Retrieved from
https://sars.org.uk/BOK/Applied%20R&M%20Manual%20for%20Defence%20S
ystems%20(GR-77)/p4c04.pdf
Safety Management International Collaboration Group. (2013). Measuring safety
performance guidelines for service providers. Skybrary. Retrieved from
https://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/2395.pdf
Saaty, T. L. (1980). The Analytic Hierarchy Process. McGraw-Hill Education.
Spall, J. C. (2003). Introduction to stochastic search and optimization. Wiley.
Spear, R.C., & Hornberger, G. M. (1980). Identification of critical uncertainties via
generalized sensitivity analysis. Water Research, 14(1), 43-49.
Stemler, S., & Tsai, J. (2008). Best practices in interrater reliability three common
approaches. In Osborne, J. Best practices in quantitative methods (pp. 29-49).
Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc. doi: 10.4135/9781412995627
Stolzer, A. J. & Goglia, J. J. (2015). Safety management systems in aviation (2st ed.).
Ashgate. doi:10.4324/9781351149648
Stonesifer, C. S., Calkin, D. E., Thompson, M. P., & Kaiden, J. D. (2014). Developing an
aviation exposure index to inform risk-based fire management decisions. Journal
of Forestry, 112(6), 581-590.
Stringfellow, M. V., Leveson, N. G., & Owens, B. G. (2010). Safety-driven design for
software-intensive aerospace and automotive systems. Proceedings of the IEEE
International Conference on Safety, Security, and Rescue Robotics, 98(4), 515525.
Stroeve, S. H., Blom, H. A. P., & Bakker, G. J. (. (2013). Contrasting safety assessments
of a runway incursion scenario: Event sequence analysis versus multi-agent
dynamic risk modelling. Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 109, 133-149.
doi:10.1016/j.ress.2012.07.002
Verweijen, B., & Lauche, K. (2019). How many blowouts does it take to learn the
lesson? An institutional perspective on disaster development. Safety Science, 111,
111-118.
.

123
APPENDIX A
Permission to Conduct Research

124

125

126
APPENDIX B
Tables
B1

Verification Scenario 2 Comparison Output

B2

Verification Scenario 2: SPI Comparison Output

B3

Verification Scenario 2: Standardized SPI Comparison Output

B4

Verification Scenario 3 Comparison Output

B5

Verification Scenario 3: SPI Comparison Output

B6

Verification Scenario 3: Standardized SPI Comparison Output
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Table B1
Verification Scenario 2 Comparison Output

SPI
1-MX
2-MX

3-MX

4-MX

5-MX

6-MX

1-FLT

Variable
Logistical
delay time
AMTs
Available*
Fleet flight
time
Percent of AC
available
Total AC in
fleet*
Fleet flight
time
Total MX
orders
processed
Unscheduled
MX orders
<$10K
FAA
occurrences
Fleet flight
time
Total MX
orders
processed
AC dispatched
w/ MX error
Unstable
approaches
Flap
overspeeds
G exceedances
Tail strikes
RPM
overspeeds
Hard landings
Fleet flight
time

Model Output
Min Value Max Value
100

290

14

14

4006

13300

70

100

50

50

4006

13300

100

Mean
212

Raw Data
Lower Limit Higher Limit
100

310

14

35

7602

4000

13500

85

70

100

50

82

7602

4000

13500

800

532

100

1200

425

582

500

300

1000

1

49

6

0

40

4006

13300

7602

4000

13500

100

799

532

100

1200

0

1

0.05

0

2

6

767

156

0

946

0

3

0.54

0

3

0
0

3
7

0.42
3

0
0

3
10

0

1

0.5

0

3

1

5

1.7

0

7

4006

13300

7602

4000

13500
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2-FLT
3-FLT

4-FLT

5-FLT
6-FLT

Annual SC
survey results
Traffic
conflicts
Fleet flight
time
Full time Ips*
Active flight
students*
Months as an
IP
Event reports

Damage FAA incident
&
reports
Related
Impact
Unsched MX >
$10K
NTSB reports
Fleet flight
time

4.6

4.6

4.6

1

5.76

2

14

9

0

18

4006

13300

7602

4000

13500

100

100

100

200

335

335

335

1300

10

10

10

0

12

39

108

67

25

150

0

1

0.12

0

3

0

3

0.9

0

3

0

1

0.335

0

3

4006

13300

7602

4000

13500
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Table B2
Verification Scenario 2: SPI Comparison Output

SPI
SPI-1 MX
SPI-2 MX
SPI-3 MX
SPI-4 MX
SPI-5 MX
SPI-6 MX

Min
1.7125
0.0010
1.4
0.0121
0.0369
0

Model Output
Max
4.828
0.0035
2
0.1888
0.1393
0.005

SPI-1 FLT
SPI-2 FLT
SPI-3 FLT
SPI-4 FLT
SPI-5 FLT
SPI-6 FLT

0.0011
4.6
0.0002
4.9348
10
35

0.1737
4.6
0.0039
4.9348
10
103

Mean
3.5321
0.0019
1.698
0.073
0.0697
0.0001
0.0224
4.6
0.0013
4.9348
10
67

Raw Data
Lower Limit
Higher Limit
1.6667
5.1667
0
0.00875
0.8537
2
0.0074
0.3
0
0.26
0
0.02
0
1
0
2
0
0

0.0302
5.76
0.0045
8
36
200
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Table B3
Verification Scenario 2: Standardized SPI Comparison Output
Model Output
Max
5
5
4.999
5
5
5

Mean
2.878
4.433
3.674
1.724
1.601
0.0974

Raw Data
Lower Limit
Higher Limit
0.8883
4.8501
2.1639
4.2139
1.1229
3.4422
0.2209
1.3921
0.3281
1.7218
0
0.4562

SPI
SPI-1 MX
SPI-2 MX
SPI-3 MX
SPI-4 MX
SPI-5 MX
SPI-6 MX

Min
0
3.411
2.384
0
0
0

SPI-1 FLT
SPI-2 FLT
SPI-3 FLT
SPI-4 FLT
SPI-5 FLT
SPI-6 FLT

0
1.218
0
1.125
3.611
0

5
1.218
5
1.125
3.611
5

0.5917
1.218
1.702
1.125
3.611
2.382

0.0189
1.2185
0.3660
0.4610
3.6111
0.8000

2.0034
1.2185
2.0590
3.9552
3.6111
4.0250

Damage &
Related
Impact

0

0.4197

0.084

0

0.0002
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Table B4
Verification Scenario 3 Comparison Output

SPI
1-MX
2-MX

3-MX

4-MX

5-MX

6-MX

1-FLT

Variable
Logistical
delay time
AMTs
Available*
Fleet flight
time
Percent of AC
available
Total AC in
fleet*
Fleet flight
time
Total MX
orders
processed
Unscheduled
MX orders
<$10K
FAA
occurrences
Fleet flight
time
Total MX
orders
processed
AC dispatched
w/ MX error
Unstable
approaches
Flap
overspeeds
G exceedances
Tail strikes
RPM
overspeeds
Hard landings
Fleet flight
time

Model Output
Min Value Max Value
100

290

35

35

4006

13300

70

100

82

82

4006

13300

100

Mean
212

Raw Data
Lower Limit Higher Limit
100

310

14

35

7606

4000

13500

85

70

100

50

82

7602

4000

13500

800

532

100

1200

425

582

500

300

1000

1

49

6

0

40

4006

13300

7606

4000

13500

100

799

532

100

1200

0

1

0.05

0

2

6

767

156

0

946

0

3

0.54

0

3

0
0

3
7

0.42
3

0
0

3
10

0

1

0.5

0

3

1

5

1.7

0

7

4006

13300

7606

4000

13500
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2-FLT
3-FLT

4-FLT

5-FLT
6-FLT

Annual SC
survey results
Traffic
conflicts
Fleet flight
time
Full time Ips*
Active flight
students*
Months as an
IP
Event reports

Damage FAA incident
&
reports
Related
Impact
Unsched MX >
$10K
NTSB reports
Fleet flight
time

4.6

4.6

4.6

1

5.76

2

14

9

0

18

4006

13300

7606

4000

13500

200

200

100

200

1300

1300

335

1300

10

10

10

0

12

39

108

67

25

150

0

1

0.12

0

3

0

3

0.9

0

3

0

1

0.335

0

3

4006

13300

7606

4000

13500
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Table B5
Verification Scenario 3: SPI Comparison Output

SPI
SPI-1 MX
SPI-2 MX
SPI-3 MX
SPI-4 MX
SPI-5 MX
SPI-6 MX

Min
1.7125
0.0036
0.8537
0.0121
0.0369
0

Model Output
Max
4.8741
0.0087
1.219
0.1888
0.1393
0.0053

SPI-1 FLT
SPI-2 FLT
SPI-3 FLT
SPI-4 FLT
SPI-5 FLT
SPI-6 FLT

0.0001
4.6
0.0002
6.5
10
35

0.1799
4.6
0.0035
6.5
10
103

Mean
3.526
0.0048
1.035
0.0734
0.0697
0.0001
0.6167
4.6
0.0013
6.5
10
67

Raw Data
Lower Limit
Higher Limit
1.6667
5.1667
0
0.00875
0.8537
2
0.0074
0.3
0
0.26
0
0.02
0
1
0
2
0
0

0.0302
5.76
0.0045
8
36
200

134
Table B6
Verification Scenario 3: Standardized SPI Comparison Output
Model Output
Max
5
3.973
1.595
5
5
5

Mean
2.878
2.554
0.7873
1.724
1.601
0.0974

Raw Data
Lower Limit
Higher Limit
0.8883
4.8501
2.1639
4.2139
1.1229
3.4422
0.2209
1.3921
0.3281
1.7218
0
0.4562

SPI
SPI-1 MX
SPI-2 MX
SPI-3 MX
SPI-4 MX
SPI-5 MX
SPI-6 MX

Min
0
0
0.0007
0
0
0

SPI-1 FLT
SPI-2 FLT
SPI-3 FLT
SPI-4 FLT
SPI-5 FLT
SPI-6 FLT

0
1.218
0.0990
3.75
3.611
0

5
1.218
4.807
3.75
3.611
5

0.6167
1.218
1.676
3.75
3.611
2.054

0.0189
1.2185
0.3660
0.4610
3.6111
0.8000

2.0034
1.2185
2.0590
3.9552
3.6111
4.0250

Damage &
Related
Impact

0

0.2947

0.0502

0

0.0002
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APPENDIX C
Figures
C1

Probability Density Distribution of the Maintenance Score in Verification
Scenario 2

C2

Probability Density Distribution of the Flight Score in Verification Scenario 2

C3

Probability Density Distribution of the Damage & Related Impact Score in
Verification Scenario 2

C4

Probability Density Distribution of the Overall Risk Score in Verification
Scenario 2

C5

Probability Density Distribution of the Maintenance Score in Verification
Scenario 3

C6

Probability Density Distribution of the Flight Score in Verification Scenario 3

C7

Probability Density Distribution of the Damage & Related Impact Score in
Verification Scenario 3

C8

Probability Density Distribution of the Overall Risk Score in Verification
Scenario 3
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Figure C1. Probability density distribution of the Maintenance Score in Verification
Scenario 2.

.
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Figure C2. Probability density distribution of the Flight Score in Verification Scenario 2.
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Figure C3. Probability density distribution of the Damage & Related Impact Score in
Verification Scenario 2.
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Figure C4. Probability density distribution of the Overall Risk Score in Verification
Scenario 2.
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Figure C5. Probability density distribution of the Maintenance Score in Verification
Scenario 3.
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Figure C6. Probability density distribution of the Flight Score in Verification Scenario 3.
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Figure C7. Probability density distribution of the Damage & Related Impact Score in
Verification Scenario 3.
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Figure C8. Probability density distribution of the Overall Risk Score in Verification
Scenario 3.

